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The police, of course, are entitled to enjoy the substantial advantages
. . . technology confers. They may not, however, rely on it blindly.
With the benefits of more efficient law enforcement mechanisms
1
comes the burden of corresponding constitutional responsibilities.

Data has always figured centrally in crime control and
surveillance by law enforcement. From early efforts to measure
the heads, faces, and ears of criminal suspects, to modern efforts to secure DNA from arrestees, governments have collected
2
data on individuals thought to pose criminal risk. They have
also generated data, recording arrests, issuing warrants, and
even creating publicly available lists of individuals thought to
3
raise safety concern. A prime example of the latter is the current profusion of government-created registries targeting specific sub-populations, most notably convicted sex offenders but
4
increasingly others as well.
But what if this information is wrong? What recourse is
available for data mistakes? Arrested because of a database error indicating that an active arrest warrant exists on you? Sorry, you must suffer the trauma of an arrest, as well as a search
of your body (including possibly a strip search), miss work and
incur other social, reputational, and economic misfortunes.
DNA unlawfully collected by police? Sorry, the government
might well retain and use the genetic profile generated. Mislabeled a sex offender and find yourself subject to harassment or
vigilantism at the hands of fellow community members? Again,
sorry, you’re likely out of luck; your best bet is to change residences.
Today, as Justice Ginsburg recently noted, databases “form
the nervous system of contemporary criminal justice operations,” but “[t]he risk of error stemming from these databases is
5
not slim.” Indeed, research has long documented significant
6
quality problems with criminal justice databases, and no less
1. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
2. See infra Part I. While the term “data” is the plural form of “datum,”
data is used here in conformity with common usage. See Jane Bambauer, Is
Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 59 n.3 (2014).
3. See infra Part I.
4. Id.
5. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING ACCESS TO AND INTEGRITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS 7 (2005)
[hereinafter B.J.S., IMPROVING ACCESS]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD IN-
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than four recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions involved indi7
viduals wrongly arrested because of invalid warrants. And
while governments in the past acted to correct errors, for instance by removing an exonerated individual’s photo from a
8
public “rogues’ gallery,” such solicitude is now a quaint reminder of a bygone era. Today, the prevailing zeitgeist of gov9
ernments is one of database expansion, not quality control or
accountability, and a blasé acceptance of data error and its
10
negative consequences for individuals. Compounding matters,
not only is the accuracy of databases accepted as an article of
11
faith, with courts according them a presumption of reliabilFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001 UPDATE 38 (2001) [hereinafter
B.J.S., USE AND MANAGEMENT REPORT]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DATA QUALITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS 1–4 (1985)
[hereinafter B.J.S., DATA QUALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORDS]; COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEVELOPMENT OF
A NATIONWIDE CRIMINAL DATA EXCHANGE SYSTEM—NEED TO DETERMINE
COST AND IMPROVE REPORTING 9–11, 93 (1973); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 7, 10, 266, 268 (1967); see also Donald L. Doernberg & Donald H. Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing: An Analysis of Computerized Criminal History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110, 1153–54 (1980) (recounting studies showing significant database deficiencies dating back to the
late 1960s).
7. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012);
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554
U.S. 191 (2008); Arizona v. Evans 514 U.S. 1 (1995). In Evans, the record indicated that on the day of defendant’s unlawful arrest (based on a previously
withdrawn warrant), three other similar arrests occurred in the same locality.
Evans, 514 U.S. at 28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Crawford v. Marion
Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 219 n.23 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
problems with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles database in cases related to a
voter identification statute); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 692
(1996) (acknowledging errors in the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System database).
8. Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1567–68
(2012).
9. A zeal, it should not go unmentioned, not reflected in law enforcement
interest in collecting and making available data on instances of possible misconduct by officers. See Tom Jackman, Only 53 Police Agencies Participating
in National Push for Use of Force Statistics, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2016/04/26/only-53
-police-agencies-participating-in-national-push-for-use-of-force-statistics; Martin Kaste, Coaxing Police To Share Data on Officers’ Conduct, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/22/
475312581/coaxing-police-to-share-data-on-officers-conduct.
10. See, e.g., Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due
Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2005) (noting growing acceptance of erroneous “indications of criminality”).
11. See P. STEPHEN GIDIERE III, THE FEDERAL INFORMATION MANUAL:
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12

ity, but police reliance on faulty databases is effectively con13
doned. And as a result of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
14
in Utah v. Strieff, police will have more reason than ever to rely on databases because they know that they can unlawfully
seize an individual, scan a database for an arrest warrant
(based, for instance, on alleged failure to pay a fine or appear in
15
court), and conduct a search based on the resulting arrest.
When collected and maintained with proper care and diligence, data can promote the goal of achieving a fairer and more

HOW THE GOVERNMENT COLLECTS, MANAGES, AND DISCLOSES INFORMATION
UNDER FOIA AND OTHER STATUTES 176 (2006) (“Once information is placed in
an electronic database, the human tendency is to accept the accuracy of that
information without question.”); MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM,
NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, WANTED: ACCURATE FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 2 (2013) (“The FBI is more than a mere
receptacle of information; the imprimatur of the FBI marks the records as authoritative and trustworthy. The FBI must bear the responsibility to ensure
accuracy given that the records are official federal documents.”); see also
DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 324
(1989) (coining the phrase pertaining to computers “garbage in, gospel out”);
L.R. Shannon, The Apt Quotation via Electronics, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1990,
at C11 (“If you put tomfoolery into a computer, nothing comes out but tomfoolery. But this tomfoolery, having passed through a very expensive machine, is
somehow ennobled and no one dare criticize it.” (quoting Pierre Galois)).
12. See, e.g., United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 121–22 (4th Cir.
2014) (stating that the “pervasive use of NCIC reports . . . indicates that such
reports may be trusted”); State v. Stevens, 33 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015) (noting that the state criminal records “system is one on which officers
regularly rely” and rejecting argument that police must confirm the accuracy
of records); O’Bryan v. State, 464 S.W.3d 875, 880–81 (Tex. App. 2015) (stating
that the “NCIC—and its records—has received widespread acceptance as
providing a sufficient basis for both probable cause and reasonable suspicion”).
13. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (condoning arrests based on invalid arrest warrants in databases and stating that evidence
secured as a result of an arrest is subject to exclusion only “[i]f the police have
been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests”).
14. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
15. See id. at 2068–69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the many millions of outstanding arrest warrants in state, local, and federal databases, “the
vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses,” and the routine access
to such databases by police to arrest and search individuals); see also id. at
2064 (“This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing
nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay,
courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything
he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant.”); id.
at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “far from a Barney Fife-type
mishap, [the officer’s] seizure of Strieff was a calculated decision” motivated by
an independent investigative purpose).
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16

effective criminal justice system. As noted by former U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, “[T]here is a ‘straight-line
relationship’ between high-quality criminal history record information and the effectiveness of the Nation’s criminal justice
17
system.” Used inappropriately or without appropriate quality
control safeguards and accountability, however, the information can imperil individual liberty and privacy, and impose
significant physical, emotional, and economic harms. The question thus becomes, first, how to create an accountability structure to better ensure data quality in the criminal justice system
and allow for the detection of errors ex ante. And second, relatedly, how to afford a legal basis for redress when government
fails to live up to the responsible stewardship of the data it collects, generates, and uses.
While a substantial and still-growing literature exists on
the individual liberty and privacy perils associated with large,
18
multi-source data assemblage, known as “big data,” this Article addresses the pitfalls of “small” data (i.e., individual-level,
discrete data points) in the criminal justice system. Because
small data provides the building blocks for all data-driven systems, enhancing data quality and promoting greater government accountability will have a major positive effect on the
19
criminal justice system as a whole.
The diverse forms of data error, and the varied contexts in
which errors arise, make the practical challenge an estimable
20
one. At the same time, the most commonly advocated remedial
16. For a comprehensive treatment of the central role criminal records
have come to play, see JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD
(2015).
17. B.J.S., USE AND MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 6 (quoting U.S. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh).
18. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904,
1920–21 (2013) (“‘Big Data’ is shorthand for the combination of a technology
and a process. The technology is a configuration of information-processing
hardware capable of sifting, sorting, and interrogating vast quantities of data
in very short times. The process involves mining the data for patterns, distilling the patterns into predictive analytics, and applying the analytics to new
data. Together, the technology and the process comprise a technique for converting data flows into a particular, highly data-intensive type of knowledge.”);
see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 352–53 (2015) (further defining the concept of
“big data”).
19. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 323–27 (2008) (noting the snowball effect
of inaccurate data when combined in larger databases).
20. The challenge, it is worth noting, is heightened by interconnected,
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course of action, constitutional litigation, holds little realistic
promise of delivering the kind of foundational change needed.
This Article therefore urges a package of reforms, including legislatively prescribed data quality standards, database audits
designed to systematically and regularly assess accuracy, and
legal mechanisms to redress harms resulting from data errors.
Achieving such broad-scale reform will be no easy task, in
no small part because states, which are the key players in crim21
inal justice, must be brought on board. As it turns out, as a
result of federal regulatory initiatives dating back to the early
1970s, the infrastructure is in place to compel improvements
among the states. What has been lacking is federal resolve to
force states to actually comply with data quality regulations,
which have long served as the nominal precondition for state
receipt of federal funds and continued access to federally operated national databases—such as the National Crime Infor22
mation Center (NCIC)—on which states today heavily rely.
Setting standards and providing incentives to ensure data
accuracy is no less important today than the early 1970s, the
dawn of information automation. Without incentives to devise
multi-source databases, raising the risk that errors arising in one context,
which might not have immediate adverse impact, can in effect be re-purposed
in another larger database with such impact. Cf. Marc L. Miller & Ronald F.
Wright, “The Wisdom We Have Lost”: Sentencing Information and Its Uses, 58
STAN. L. REV. 361, 380 (2005) (emphasizing the need to monitor and match
data with different users and uses).
21. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 18 (12th ed. 2008) (“[W]hen the federal system is
compared to the state systems as a group, the combined state systems clearly
dominate, as they account for a much larger portion of the nation’s criminal
justice workload (e.g., roughly 96% of all felony prosecutions and over 99% of
all misdemeanor prosecutions).”).
22. Focus on the states is also imperative because the federal government,
which maintains the national databases to which states contribute their records, has often exempted itself from quality control expectations otherwise
imposed upon federal agencies. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 19.6(b)(6) (2012) (exempting FBI in its operation of the NCIC from ensuring compliance with Privacy
Act of 1974 requirements that data be “accurate, relevant, timely and complete” because doing so would be “administratively impossible” in that “many
of these records come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign, tribal, and
international agencies”); see also Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the
Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and
Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (2013)
(“The United States Code currently contains over twenty separate statutes
that restrict both the acquisition and release of covered information. . . . Yet
across this remarkable diversity, there is one feature that all these statutes
share in common: each contains a provision exempting law enforcement from
its general terms.”).

2016]

POLICING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA

547

ways to detect and correct database errors, criminal justice system actors who control the actual data and its use have little
23
institutional reason to make improvements. And if governments lack incentive or interest in data quality, most assuredly
so too will the private vendors that figure critically in the data
marketplace. Providing legal and economic incentives to find
and cure bad data, promote accountability, and end impunity
for errors will also encourage innovations in the construction
and operation of evolving database systems, as already wit24
nessed in the similarly data-dependent health care and credit
25
rating industries.
The changes proposed here are as timely as they are important. After many years of providing states guidance on data
quality control, and allocating millions of dollars in funding to
26
construct and operate databases, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that the “federal commitment to improving
[state] record systems now needs to be rethought and reinvigorated” and that “[m]uch more needs to be done to achieve uniformity in the improvement of record quality and complete27
ness.” More recently, the American Law Institute, as part of
23. See, e.g., Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?,
96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1131–32 (2013) (surveying how a variety of institutional and political forces combine to discourage data collection and transparency among law enforcement); see also Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of
Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 473 (2013) (stating with respect to
the “terrorist watch list” that “a large watch list makes national security
threats seem prevalent, which makes the agency’s activities particularly necessary, which encourages attention and resources to flow to the agency and
the watch list. That encourages agencies to keep false positives—people incorrectly identified as terrorist threats—on their watch lists”); Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1491,
1543 (2015) (citation omitted) (“Ultimately, it is foolish to assume that law enforcement agencies engaged in the ‘often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime’ will adopt appropriate policies without external oversight.”); Kevin
Lapp, Databasing Delinquency, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 211 (2015) (“Even
where [gang database] purging procedures are in place, they are rarely carried
out. There is little incentive for law enforcement to purge records from their
intelligence databases.”).
24. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, Medical Big Data and Big Data Quality
Problems, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 289, 295–306 (2014).
25. See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis et al., Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating
Agencies a Good Idea?: Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the
Global Financial Crisis, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 175 (2012); F. Phillip Hosp,
Problems and Reforms in Mortgage-Backed Securities: Handicapping the Credit Rating Agencies, 79 MISS. L.J. 531 (2010).
26. See infra notes 301–23 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 126 (2006).
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its newly inaugurated project, Principles of the Law, Police In28
vestigations, has signaled its intent to address data quality.
Part I of this Article details the rise of the modern datadriven criminal justice system. Governments today collect and
generate massive amounts of data on individuals, in myriad
contexts. It is well known, however, that the information contained in government databases is often incorrect or misleading. These errors can have life-changing consequences for individuals, imperiling jobs, homes, liberty, privacy, and
reputation, and adversely impact the communities in which
they live. At the same time, faulty databases negatively affect
government: errors undermine the public’s trust in government
competence and evenhandedness, and result in significant inefficiencies as resources are misdirected toward innocent targets.
Part II examines the significant legal and practical barriers that stand in the way of detecting, curing, and remedying
data error. Constitutional arguments based on due process and
the Fourth Amendment have largely been rejected and governments and their agents often enjoy immunity from liability.
Meanwhile, litigation realities limit discovery and technological
barriers make identifying and correcting error among vast
networked databases a very difficult task.
Part III offers two interrelated solutions. First, we urge increased federal and state involvement in auditing and enforcing data quality accountability, backed by the federal government tying state funding to satisfaction of federal criteria and
benchmarks. Second, we propose a package of statutory reforms designed to take advantage of the ex ante detection of error allowed by enhanced auditing, and when revealed, a legal
means of correction and redress.
Part IV concludes by examining the obstacles that have
stood in the way of constructive change and discusses how and
why such obstacles can be overcome. Of late, we have witnessed
increasing public and legislative concern over the privacy im29
plications of big data. This Article seeks to generate commen-

28. Am. Law Inst., The American Law Institute Announces Project on Police Investigations, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/the-american-law-institute-announces-project-on-police
-investigations-300038510.html.
29. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433, 472
(2014); Joel R. Reidenberg, The Transparent Citizen, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 437
(2015).
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surate concern for the fallibility of small data, in the name of
enhancing data quality and affording redress for those negatively affected by database errors.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DATA-DRIVEN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
Data on individuals has long been the lifeblood of the criminal justice system. Warehouses of court files and aging police
file cabinets, dating back decades, attest to the practice of assembling vast amounts of detailed personal information. In the
past, the magnitude and fragmented nature of such paper records limited their utility; files lacked inter-operability among
jurisdictions and could not be accessed without a significant investment of time and effort. The digitization of these records,
coupled with ever expanding computer power, has meant that
data can be stored, accessed, and analyzed in a far more effi30
cient manner. The data, moreover, does not stand in isolation
but rather is often linked in ways that promote the social control ends of government. This Part surveys how the criminal
justice system has been transformed into a data-centric system,
the system’s fallibility, and the consequences of data errors.
A. DATA COLLECTION AND GENERATION
The criminal justice system extends from pre-crime surveillance techniques to post-sentencing community supervision.
In almost every context, the system has seen a rapid expansion
in data collection, generation, storage, and use. This Section
surveys several of the chief areas of activity, demonstrating the
growing data-dependency of the criminal justice system.
1. Data Collection
Dating back to at least London’s Bow Street in the mid1700s, where courts stored information on people suspected of
31
having committed fraud or a felony, personal data has figured
in social control efforts. In America, as organized police forces
first took shape in the 1840s, the “police blotter,” chronicling
the names, race, sex, and alleged offense of arrestees, was

30. See generally Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From
Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE L. REV. 65, 69–77 (2006) (summarizing
criminal record information systems in American history).
31. 2 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW (1957).
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32

maintained by individual departments. On the streets, detectives gained renown for their “spotting” ability, mentally stor33
ing the faces of suspects. Soon thereafter, departments turned
34
to early photographic innovations, creating more permanent
and useful records on individuals and publicly displaying them
35
in “rogues’ galleries.” Photos, however, soon fell out of favor,
36
both because of the protean nature of facial appearances and
the difficulty of organizing and cataloging images in a readily
37
accessible manner.
Starting in the early 1890s, police began collecting finger38
prints from criminal suspects, which proved far more reliable
39
and easier to store and analyze. By the 1930s, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Investigation (later to become
the FBI), under the direction of J. Edgar Hoover, embraced fingerprints as the mainstay technique for suspect identification
40
and investigation. By 1956, the FBI had over 141 million fin41
gerprints on file. In 1967, the FBI established the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) as part of its continued effort
to develop a nationwide criminal records system that in 1971
42
employed emerging computer technology. Technological advances such as the National Automated Fingerprint Identifica32. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL
RECORDS OF ENTRY 5–7 (1990).
33. HOWARD O. SPROGLE, THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE, PAST AND PRESENT
273, 653 (1887).
34. See Peter Becker, The Standardized Gaze: The Standardization of the
Search Warrant in Nineteenth-Century Germany, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE PRACTICES IN THE MODERN WORLD
139, 154–55 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001) (explaining that courts
turned to drawn portraits and soon thereafter photographs as a more objective
and mechanical means of identifying criminals). Earlier, in 1819, Germany
and France employed a device that permitted an individual’s bodily shadow to
be projected onto paper in silhouette form when the person was situated between the device and light. Id. at 155–56.
35. JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1901, at 122 (1970); SPROGLE, supra note 33, at 265–66.
36. See SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 48 (2001).
37. Id. at 26.
38. Id. at 65, 70. Cole notes that Albany, New York, detective John Maloy
may have relied upon fingerprints even earlier. Id. at 120.
39. See id. at 165.
40. See Federal Crime Registry Results in 236 Arrests, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
12, 1932, at A12.
41. DON WHITEHEAD, THE FBI STORY: A REPORT TO THE PEOPLE 139
(1956).
42. B.J.S., USE AND MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 6, at 26–27.
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tion System (AFIS) in 1985 and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) in 1999, permitted au43
tomated access to and analysis of digitally stored prints.
More recently, scientific advances have afforded police an
44
array of new biometric identifiers. While iris, retina, and faci45
al recognition are still in various stages of development, DNA
46
collection is now an accepted part of being arrested. CODIS—
a federal database containing DNA profiles collected by state,
local, and federal law enforcement—now includes over eleven
47
million offender profiles. Meanwhile, several jurisdictions
have created their own independent, largely unregulated DNA
48
49
databases with the help of for-profit enterprises. Such
measures are complemented by emerging “panvasive” surveillance strategies, including car license plate scanners, closed50
circuit television, and drones.
Collecting data requires mechanisms to catalogue data.
Spurred in significant part by the desire to recognize recidivists
targeted for enhanced punishment, penal reformers in midnineteenth century France revolutionized criminal recordkeep-

43. See Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 806–08 (2010). IAFIS now constitutes the
largest criminal identification system in existence. See Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://
www.fbi.gov/file-repository/about-us-cjis-fingerprints_biometrics-biometric
-center-of-excellences-iafis_0808_one-pager825.
44. “Biometrics” refers to biological (anatomical or physiological) traits
usable for the recognition of individuals. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PRIVACY AND BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 4 (2006), http://
www.biometrics.gov/Documents/privacy.pdf.
45. See generally Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap,
and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97
MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012) (discussing the evolution of biometric technologies
and how they fit into current jurisprudence).
46. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (“[T]aking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is . . . a legitimate police booking
procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
47. See CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://
www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics
(last
updated July 2016).
48. Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The
Underregulated World of State and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 639, 655 (2014).
49. See Kreag, supra note 23, at 1506–07.
50. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political
Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721 (2014)
(discussing panvasive surveillance techniques and their constitutionality).
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51

ing. In Germany, identifying information on criminal suspects
52
and others was carefully recorded and maintained on cards,
enabling police to “put their hands on any citizen when they
53
want[ed] him.” England first had an “Alphabetical Register of
54
Habitual Criminals” and maintained into the 1890s a “Register of Distinctive Marks” containing photos and information on
bodily marks such as scars and tattoos as well as criminal mo55
dus operandi.
Around that time, American corrections officials and law
enforcement agencies gravitated toward a French-originated
system of cataloging individuals based on precise bodily measurements of the head, finger, and ear, known as anthropome56
try. The data, combined with criminal history information arrayed in file drawers based on measurements, afforded a more
57
readily accessible way to identify criminal suspects. According
to an editorial in Indiana’s Fort Wayne News, anthropometry
was essential to the development of a “general system of criminal registration. . . . Properly used[, the system] will be nearly
58
as infallible as a system designed by man can be.”
Despite use by several large urban police departments as
well as the Pinkerton Detective Agency, anthropometry never
enjoyed nationwide use in significant part due to the difficulty
59
associated with the precise recording of measurements. Start51. See COLE, supra note 36 at 15–16.
52. RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, EUROPEAN POLICE SYSTEMS 354–58 (1915).
53. Id. at 356; see also Mathieu Deflem, Surveillance and Criminal Statistics: Historical Foundations of Governmentality, in 17 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 149, 162 (Austin Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1997)
(“German police squads would raid hotels, lodging houses and public places,
and check apprehended persons with information collected in the registration
system.”). Not surprisingly, the Nazi Party, which rose to power several decades later, greatly benefited from the system. See generally Robert M.W.
Kempner, The German National Registration System as Means of Police Control of Population, 36 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 362 (1946) (describing the
various German registration systems).
54. See Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Incapacitating the Habitual
Criminal: The English Experience, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1340–43, 1348
(1980) (discussing legislation that led to the creation of the Register).
55. Id. at 1349.
56. COLE, supra note 36, at 146–51.
57. See Martha Merrill Umphrey, “The Sun Has Been Too Quick for
Them”: Criminal Portraiture and the Police in the Late Nineteenth Century, in
16 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 139, 149 (1997).
58. Editorial, Prison Reform V: The Incorrigible Criminal, FORT WAYNE
NEWS, Dec. 30, 1896, at 2.
59. COLE, supra note 36, at 52. For evidence of the constancy of police in-
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ing in the 1930s, local governments began experimenting with
another method requiring that individuals convicted of particular crimes register with police and provide personal identifying
60
information such as addresses and photos. With this information in hand, police could readily identify individuals to
question and detain if a crime was committed that was similar
61
to the registrant’s history. In 1947, California enacted the
first statewide registry, which targeted convicted sex offend62
ers, and in the ensuing decades, a handful of other states implemented registries for convicted sex offenders and other subpopulations such as individuals convicted of narcotics
63
offenses.
State interest in registries, however, remained modest until the 1990s, when registration experienced a surge in legislative attention. Eponymous laws memorializing child victims
such as Megan’s Law in New Jersey (named after a twelveyear-old girl who was sexually assaulted and killed by a recidi64
vist sex offender who lived nearby) swept the nation. As before, the laws required targeted individuals to provide and to
update identifying information for police use. New generation
laws, however, had an important new distinguishing feature:
information on registrants was no longer monopolized by police
65
but rather was publicly disseminated to communities.
Today, sex offender registration and community notification laws are in place nationwide, targeting individuals for a
66
minimum of two years and very often their lifetimes. State
government-operated Internet websites now contain personal
identifying information on over 800,000 individuals, providing
photos; home, work, and school addresses; descriptions of scars

terest in bodily markings one need only consider perhaps the nation’s most
technologically advanced police department, the New York City Police Department, which maintains databases on tattoos, birthmarks, and scars. Michael S. Schmidt, Have a Tattoo or Walk with a Limp? The Police May Know,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at A19.
60. See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 22–30 (2009) (discussing local criminal registration laws).
61. Id. at 33–37.
62. Id. at 31.
63. Id. at 31–33.
64. Id. at 54–55.
65. Id. at 53.
66. See Wayne A. Logan, Database Infamia: Exit from the Sex Offender
Registries, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 219, 225–30.
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67

and tattoos; and vehicle information. Other registries, not always made available to community members, target groups
like convicted methamphetamine dealers, animal abusers, ar68
sonists, and gun crime violators.
More recently, governments have created databases concerning other individuals thought worthy of concern. At least
eleven states and several large urban police departments including New York City have targeted suspected gang mem69
bers. Unlike registries, the databases do not require individuals to register. Nor do they require that the targeted individual
be convicted of a gang-related crime. Indeed, it is usually the
case that individuals are not aware that they are in a data70
base. Similarly, they lack the ability to contest inclusion once
71
made aware, or seek confirmation that they have been purged.
Police on their own identify individuals thought worthy of inclusion, and personal identifying information on them is gathered by departments for future surveillance and possible deten72
tion. The FBI has collected and made this information
available via the National Gang Intelligence Center, in opera73
tion since 2005.
Concerns over terrorism have fueled additional data collection efforts. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the federal government began an ambitious collection of per74
sonal data in an effort to identify potential terrorist risks.
67. Id. at 220.
68. See LOGAN, supra note 60, at 73–74, 178–81.
69. See K. Babe Howell, Gang Policing: The Post Stop-and-Frisk Justification for Profile-Based Policing, 5 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2015); Rebecca A. Hufstader, Note, Immigration Reliance on Gang Databases: Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable Consequences, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 671, 676–
78 (2015); see also Gang Databases, NAT’L GANG CTR., https://www
.nationalgangcenter.gov/Legislation/Databases (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
70. Hufstader, supra note 69, at 680; see also Ali Winston, You May Be in
California’s Gang Database and Not Even Know It, REVEAL NEWS (March 23,
2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/you-may-be-in-californias-gang
-database-and-not-even-know-it.
71. Lapp, supra note 23, at 211–12.
72. Hufstader, supra note 69, at 677–78.
73. See National Gang Intelligence Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/violent-crime/gangs/ngic (last visited
Nov. 1, 2016).
74. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343 (2008) (“Under the TIA [Total Information
Awareness] program, the government would assemble a massive database
consisting of financial, educational, health, and other information on U.S. citizens, which would later be analyzed to single out people matching a terrorist
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Public concern over security and privacy eventually led to the
ending of these programs, but other less-controversial data
75
tracking programs still exist. Currently, the federal government oversees an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) initiative that suggests practices to facilitate data sharing be76
tween intelligence and law enforcement entities. In addition,
states, localities, and federal agencies including Homeland Security and the FBI, gather and maintain data on individuals in
77
Fusion Centers, which allow for the sharing and analysis of
78
information collected. The federal government generates
“watchlists” vis-à-vis particular individuals; the Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB) includes 700,000 individuals, the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) over a mil79
lion names, and a no-fly list almost 50,000. While focused
primarily on international targets, the data have been made
80
available to domestic law enforcement agencies.
Finally, state and local governments participate in federal81
ly funded “criminal intelligence systems.” States operate them
82
individually or in conjunction with one another on the premise

profile.”).
75. K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the
Dots To Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 9 n.28 (2003);
see also id. at 14 (“The notion that powerful analytical tools developed for
commercial and scientific application will not eventually be used for terrorism
prevention (or, for that matter, general law enforcement purposes) seems unrealistic, particularly since these technologies are already being used in a wide
variety of law enforcement contexts.” (footnote omitted)).
76. See INFO. SHARING ENV’T, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2015),
https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/FINAL_ISE_Annual_Report_2015_FOR_
WEB_0.pdf; Data Aggregation Reference Architecture (DARA), INFO. SHARING
ENV’T, https://www.ise.gov/resources/Data-Aggregation-Reference-Architecture
(last visited Nov. 1, 2016); INFO. SHARING ENV’T, DATA TAGGING FUNCTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS (2014), https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/PO3-Data
-Tagging-Functional-Requirements.pdf.
77. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., State and Major Urban Area Fusion
Centers, http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers (last
updated June 17, 2016).
78. See generally Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion
of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 328–29 (2014).
79. Timothy B. Lee, The Government’s Biggest Terrorist Watchlist Has
More than a Million Names, VOX (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/5/
5972403/the-governments-terrorism-watchlist-explained.
80. See Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1787–
88 (2015).
81. See Frequently Asked Questions, CRIM. INTELLIGENCE SYS. OPERATING
POLICIES, https://28cfr.iir.com/FAQ (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
82. See, e.g., REGIONAL GANG INTELLIGENCE DATABASE, http://www.rgid
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that “[t]he exposure of such ongoing networks of criminal activity can be aided by the pooling of information about such activi83
ties.” Individuals or organizations (such as gangs) are targeted when “there is a reasonable possibility that [the] individual
or organization is involved in a definable criminal activity or
84
enterprise.”
2. Data Generation
Police do not merely collect data on individuals; they also
actively generate it. In the discharge of their law enforcement
duties, for instance, police regularly subject individuals to investigatory “stops” (based on reasonable suspicion of criminal
85
activity) and arrests (requiring probable cause of criminal ac86
tivity). Police annually generate records on a huge volume of
87
88
stops and arrests of individuals. In 2013 alone, arrests na89
tionwide numbered almost 11.3 million. These individual cases are dutifully recorded and memorialized. In a prior era, it
simply would not have been possible or useful to document each
of the 685,724 stops the New York Police Department made in
90
2011. Today, however, each of those stops can be accessed and
studied with a simple search query in an established database.
And, whereas in earlier times, detentions by police not result-

.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (describing the joint criminal intelligence system between Illinois and Indiana).
83. 28 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2015).
84. Id. § 23.20(c).
85. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
86. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003).
87. The Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics estimates that there were
forty million police-civilian contacts in 2008. Press Release, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Contacts Between Police and the Public Declined from 2002 to 2008
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpp08pr.cfm; see also Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1332
(2010) (“The federal government reports that 43.5 million persons had contact
with police in 2005.”).
88. See Crime in the United States 2011, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/
crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/persons-arrested/persons-arrested
(last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (arrest data).
89. Crime in the United States 2013, FBI: UCR, https://www.fbi.gov/crime
-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-2013/tables/table-29/table_29_estimated_
number_of_arrests_united_states_2013.xls (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
90. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-FRISK 2011: NYCLU BRIEFING 3 (2012), http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/NYCLU_2011_Stop-and
-Frisk_Report.pdf.
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ing in conviction were not the subject of recording by govern91
92
ments, today they figure centrally in government databases.
Convictions, unsurprisingly, are also inscribed in government databases. Together, the data are entered into “rap
93
sheets,” an acronym for “record of arrest and prosecution.” A
typical record generated provides information on the offense of
conviction and personal identifying information such as name
and date of birth, as well as a history of past criminal involve94
ment.
Arrest warrants are another common form of generated data. State, local, and federal criminal justice systems generate
and store arrest warrant information, which is entered into the
95
NCIC database. A NCIC search can reveal “active” warrants
for arrest, as well as information about whether a suspect is a
wanted person, a sex offender, a gang member, a violent per91. See, e.g., CHARLES J. BONAPARTE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEYGENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1907, H.R. Doc. No. 10, at 44
(1907) (defining “criminal identification records” as records of “persons convicted of crimes against the United States”).
92. In some jurisdictions, police contacts are recorded to generate threat
scores of individuals who come under the suspicion of police. See Justin
Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat
‘Score,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat
-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html. As will
be discussed later, police stops become part of a self-reinforcing system of digital suspicion. The more stops, the more times the individual’s name is in a database as being stopped, which results in the likelihood of more future stops.
See infra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
93. Identity History Summary Checks, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks (“[T]he FBI
can provide individuals with an Identity History Summary—often referred to
as a criminal history record or a rap sheet—listing certain information taken
from fingerprint submissions kept by the FBI and related to arrests and, in
some instances, federal employment, naturalization, and military service.”).
94. See generally Mary De Ming Fan, Reforming the Criminal Rap Sheet:
Federal Timidity and the Traditional State Functions Doctrine, 33 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 31 (2005) (describing the rap sheet, its history, and the need for
greater federal oversight).
95. David M. Bierie, National Public Registry of Active-Warrants: A Policy
Proposal, FED. PROBATION, June 2015, at 27, 28 (“The National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) is the central transactional data system that tracks
the nation’s warrants. All police agencies can enter their warrants in the system and check the system to identify whether a given individual has a warrant.”); David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration
Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 27 (2006) (“The NCIC holds all of the records police need to
search in the course of their routine enforcement tasks every day: arrest warrants, stolen vehicle reports, and criminal records, among others.”).

558

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:541
96

son, a suspected terrorist, or an immigration law violator. The
FBI reports that as of 2014, the NCIC contained thirteen million active records that were accessed by law enforcement
97
twelve million times a day. An active arrest warrant entitles
police in any jurisdiction to detain and arrest an individual, regardless of whether the warrant is generated by another juris98
diction. States are required to execute a NCIC User Agree99
ment, obliging them to satisfy all requirements in the NCIC
100
Operating Manual, which in turn allows access to the criminal justice data provided by other participating federal, state,
101
and local police agencies.
Finally, court systems generate information through pretrial service reports, pre-sentence reports and court records
that memorialize legal proceedings. Data flows through the
documents and data systems as a means to communicate with
and control participants in the criminal justice system. Postsentencing community supervision, including parole, probation,
and supervised release also results in the generation of person102
al data in large-scale databases.

96. See National Crime Information Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA(last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. For an example of such an agreement, see South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division, CONSUMER JUSTICE INFO. SYS., http://www.sled.sc.gov/
Documents/CJIS/USERAGREEMENT.pdf (last updated Mar. 21, 2014).
100. See National Crime Information Center, supra note 96. For an example of a state operating manual see NCIC OPERATING MANUAL, TECHNICAL
CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION, http://www.txdps
.state.tx.us/SecurityReview/ContractorEmpRefDocNCIC2000Manual.pdf.
101. See National Crime Information Center, supra note 96; Ferguson, supra note 18, at 360 (“Most officers have access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized database of criminal justice information . . . . Once police have accessed the NCIC system, they can pull up
physical characteristics or addresses and query the database to determine
whether observed suspects live in an area or whether they match a description
of a wanted suspect.”).
102. Murphy, supra note 43, at 808–09 (discussing how NCIC has incorporated “persons on supervised release” into the database); see also, e.g., Jason
Matejkowski & Michael Ostermann, Serious Mental Illness, Criminal Risk,
Parole Supervision, and Recidivism: Testing of Conditional Effects, 39 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 75, 78 (2015) (discussing New Jersey parole database); Joan
Petersilia, California Prison Downsizing and Its Impact on Local Criminal
Justice Systems, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 327, 354 (2014) (discussing California parole system).
TION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic
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B. DATA FALLIBILITY
Data quality concerns manifest in each of the aforementioned contexts. At the point of collection, accuracy can be impaired by basic human error. DNA and fingerprints collected at
a crime scene, for instance, can be secured in a manner that
103
compromises their forensic reliability, and even if properly
collected and stored, data can later be subject to clerical or in104
terpretive errors by technicians. What is more, based on even
the limited audits conducted to date, it is known that states
frequently upload DNA profiles not authorized by law (e.g.,
105
those of victims). Finally, DNA information collected, which
by law should have been expunged or destroyed, is known to be
retained and used by governments in subsequent investiga106
tions.
Government-generated data has proven to be no less fallible. Surprisingly little research has been done on the extent of
invalid arrest warrants in state and local databases. One of the
few formal studies, however, concluded that data errors such as
incorrect social security numbers, inaccurate names, and “illog107
ical birth dates” commonly result in wrongful arrests. In
2011, the Los Angeles Times reported that invalid warrants resulted in the unlawful arrest of almost 1500 people in Los An108
geles County during the previous five years alone. In St. Lou103. See, e.g., Ken Strutin, DNA Without Warrant: Decoding Privacy, Probable Cause and Personhood, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 319, 347 (2015) (“Every
stage in the collection, profiling, databanking and analysis of DNA evidence
can be subject to human error, mechanical error, computer error, statistical
error, false positives and cognitive biases.”).
104. Joseph Goldstein, F.B.I. Audit of Database That Indexes DNA Finds
Errors in Profiles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2014, at A15; Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Notifies Crime Labs of Errors in DNA Match Calculations Since 1999, WASH.
POST (May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-notifies
-crime-labs-of-errors-used-in-dna-match-calculations-since-1999/2015/05/29/
f04234fc-0591-11e5-8bda-c7b4e9a8f7ac_story.html.
105. ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DATA 140–41 (2015) (noting that audits of 22 of the roughly 190 laboratories nationwide revealed an error rate of six percent).
106. Wayne A. Logan, Government Retention and Use of Unlawfully Secured DNA Evidence, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 269, 280 (2015).
107. Wayne J. Pitts, From the Benches and Trenches: Dealing with Outstanding Warrants for Deceased Individuals: A Research Brief, 30 JUST. SYS. J.
219, 220 (2009).
108. Robert Faturechi & Jack Leonard, ID Errors Put Hundreds in County
Jail, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/25/local/la
-me-wrong-id-20111225 (detailing how more than 1480 people were mistakenly arrested over a five-year period).
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is, bad warrants resulted in individuals collectively spending
more than 2000 days in jail from 2005–2013, or an average of
about three weeks each, and that one individual was incarcer109
ated for 211 days. After one instance in Colorado, in which
Christina FourHorn was arrested on a warrant meant for
Christin Fourhorn in Oklahoma, “the ACLU found at least 237
cases in Colorado in which police may have arrested the wrong
110
person,” adding that “the figure [was] likely a small sample
since police often release those wrongfully arrested before the
111
first court appearance.”
Considerably more research has been done on the quality
of criminal history records, in significant part due to their use
in background checks in employment or licensing decisions and
112
firearm purchases. The work done does not paint a rosy picture. Multiple federal studies dating back decades show widespread problems with records containing incomplete and inac113
According to a 2014 U.S. Bureau of
curate information.
Justice Statistics study, nineteen states collectively have over
three million unprocessed or partially processed disposition
forms, resulting in inaccurate disposition information in indi114
viduals’ records. Only seventeen states report that eighty
109. Robert Patrick & Jennifer S. Mann, Jailed by Mistake, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/
special/st-louis-wrongful-arrests-mount-as-fingerprint-mismatches-are
-ignored/html_b153a232-208f-5d0b-86a1-ba3256f7a941.html. See generally,
Amanda Simon, Garbage in, Unnecessary Arrests Follow, ACLU: SPEAK
FREELY (Apr. 26, 2010, 12:22 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/
garbage-unnecessary-arrests-follow.
110. Stephanie Chen, Officer, You’ve Got the Wrong Person, CNN (Feb. 15,
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/15/colorado.mistaken.identity.
111. Id.; see also, e.g., Douglas Holt, Bogus Warrants Lead to False Arrests,
Suits, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 26, 1993) (stating that an audit determined that 155
people were arrested on invalid warrants in Chicago “in the year prior to February 1993” but that the audit number was likely “grossly underestimated”);
Jamie Satterfield, Knox County Court Clerk Readying Defense Against Critics,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINAL (Oct. 23, 2013) (noting that errors detected resulted in wrongful arrests and detentions, that individuals risked wrongful
revocation of probation due to delays in the updating of information, and that
defendants were categorized as guilty when in fact charges were dismissed).
112. NEIGHLY & EMSELLEM, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing the use of
background checks in employment and licensing).
113. B.J.S., DATA QUALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORDS, supra note 6,
at 19–24 (discussing studies conducted during the 1970s and 1980s); id. at 27–
28 (surveying more recent studies reporting inaccuracies).
114. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY
OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2014, at 7 (Dec. 2015),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf.
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percent or more arrests within the past five years have final
115
dispositions recorded, and only twenty-one states can say
that eighty percent or more arrests older than five years have
116
final dispositions recorded. A 2014 FBI audit found that over
one-quarter of states examined failed to comply with one or
both federal requirements that record databases contain all
known arrest and disposition information and that dispositions
117
be submitted to the FBI within 120 days of occurrence.
Other studies report similar findings. For instance, a random sample of New York State rap sheet records from 2008–
2011 conducted by the Legal Action Center found that sixty-two
percent contained at least one significant error and that thirty118
two percent contained multiple errors. That same year the
National Employment Law Project branded the nation’s rap
sheet system “broken,” concluding, inter alia, that approximately fifty percent of records lacked information regarding fi119
nal case disposition.

115. Id. at 2. The problem lies at least in part in prosecutors failing to provide disposition information to state record repositories. A 2003 survey of state
prosecutors, for instance, found that only forty-seven percent of state prosecutors who responded indicated that they regularly submitted final disposition
information to the authority charged with maintaining criminal history records. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORTING
BY PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES TO REPOSITORIES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS 1
(Apr. 2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf. When asked
why they did not report the information, eighty-six percent stated that another entity was responsible for submitting the information. Id. Those that did
report information took an average of twenty days to do so. Id. at 2.
116. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, supra note 114, at 3.
117. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE GAO-15-162, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
COULD ENHANCE THE COMPLETENESS OF RECORDS USED FOR EMPLOYMENTRELATED BACKGROUND CHECKS 25 (Feb. 2015), http://gao.gov/assets/670/
668505.pdf. States are permitted ninety days to gather and complete disposition records for own their central repositories. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(a)(1). Before
being required to report to the FBI, states are given an extra thirty days, “to
allow for processing time that may be needed by the states before forwarding
the disposition.” 28 C.F.R. app. pt. 20, § 20.37.
118. LEGAL ACTION CTR., THE PROBLEM OF RAP SHEET ERRORS: AN ANALYSIS BY THE LEGAL ACTION CENTER 1–2 (2013), https://lac.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/LAC_rap_sheet_report_final_2013.pdf; see also Briana Duggan, The Rap-Sheet Trap: One Man vs. a Multitude of Errors, CITY LIMITS
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://citylimits.org/2015/03/03/the-rap-sheet-trap-one-man-vs
-a-multidue-of-errors (noting the three most common errors: “unsealed cases”
that should be sealed, “hanging arrests” and “phantom warrants”).
119. NEIGHLY & EMSELLEM, supra note 11, at 5.
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Government-operated databases containing registry information on targeted individuals are no less error-prone. Sex offender registries are rife with errors, especially with regard to
120
home address information. Gang databases, even if populated
by actual gang members (an assessment based on often vague
121
122
criteria), are also known to commonly contain errors.
These and other errors often make their way into data aggregation services in the private sector, blending public and
123
private systems that can mask the sources of error. The companies themselves lack licensing requirements, usually disclaim responsibility of the accuracy and completeness of the re124
ports they provide, and refuse to correct detected errors.
125
reporting
Common errors include: mismatched reports,
126
127
sealed or expunged records, incomplete disposition, and
failure to correctly categorize incidents (e.g., reporting a single
arrest multiple times or classifying a misdemeanor as a felo120. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATIONS & INSPECTIONS DIV., I2009-001, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACT, v–vi (Dec. 2008)
(noting widespread inaccuracies in state registry information); Charles
Sheehan, Sex Offenders Slip Away, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 31, 2006), http://articles
.chicagotribune.com/2006-03-31/news/0603310164_1_number-of-sex-offenders
-parole-illinois-prisoner-review-board (noting that in Chicago over seventy-five
percent of randomly sampled addresses of registrants were invalid); see also
Press Release, Kansas Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General Kline Releases Results of Kansas Sex Offender Registry Audit (2005), http://cdm16884
.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16884coll31/id/151/rec/12 (describing a random sample of Kansas registrants indicating a twenty-one percent incidence of invalid home address; twenty-nine percent of invalid current
employment; and twenty-four percent of invalid vehicle identification information).
121. See Lapp, supra note 23, at 209–10.
122. See Eric. J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm:
Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 126 (2009); Joshua D.
Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
115, 119–29 (2005); see also Will Hobson, Overhaul Coming to Pinellas Gang
Intelligence Database, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.tampabay
.com/news/courts/criminal/overhaul-coming-to-pinellas-gang-intelligence
-database/2125725.
123. JACOBS, supra note 16, at 150 (discussing data brokers or “information
vendors”).
124. PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES 7–20 (2012), https://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-records-report.pdf.
125. Id. at 15–19.
126. Id. at 20–23.
127. Id. at 24–26.

2016]

POLICING CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA

563

128

ny). And, even when such private databases contain correct
information, they are known to present significant risk of mis129
matching individuals to records.
C. THE IMPACT OF DATA ERROR
1. On Individuals and Their Communities
For individuals, the impact of data error can be immediate
and traumatic. System errors leading to wrongful arrests are a
130
case in point. An arrest is a major personal event, affecting
131
physical liberty and bodily security. An arrest also affects
privacy because police can search the body of an arrestee and
132
anything within her “grab area.” And, if the arrestee is in a
car, the police can possibly search the car’s passenger com133
partment and any containers within it.
Even more significant, an arrest, even if based on an invalid warrant, can entail a strip search, as the Supreme Court recently held in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the
134
County of Burlington. In Florence, Albert Florence filed a civil
rights suit after he was mistakenly arrested despite providing
the officer evidence that the civil bench warrant issued against
him (for failure to pay a fine) was no longer valid. He was then
detained for eight days during which time he was subject to two
135
strip searches by jail officials. The five-member majority in
Florence held that the strip searches, which were conducted
128. Id. at 26–28.
129. Id. at 15.
130. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155–56 (2009) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (“Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic information raise grave concerns for individual liberty. ‘The offense to
the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public
street simply because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate
computer data base is evocative of the use of general warrants that so outraged the authors of our Bill of Rights.’” (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,
23 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
131. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing arrest as “a serious personal intrusion regardless of
whether the person seized is guilty or innocent”); Josh Bowers, Probable
Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987 (2014).
132. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
133. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341–44 (2009).
134. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
135. Id. at 1520–23.
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without any individualized suspicion that Florence possessed
weapons or contraband, did not violate the Fourth Amend136
ment.
The plight of Chelsea Bechman provides another vivid example. Ms. Bechman was at home around 9 p.m. one evening,
nursing her infant daughter, when police arrived to arrest her
based on a “possible” active arrest warrant from a database
137
“hit.” Despite her protest that the warrant—for failure for
appear to contest a charge of driving without proof of insurance—was invalid, which was the case, Ms. Bechman was arrested. As recounted by the Eighth Circuit:
While the officers were in Bechman’s home, Bechman told the officers
she was breast feeding her infant daughter and she needed to use the
bathroom because she was menstruating. The officers refused to allow
Bechman to use the bathroom without the door open and one of the
two male officers watching. Bechman had no choice but to use the
bathroom with Officer Butler observing her from the hallway. In addition, these male officers would not allow Bechman to exchange her
breast milk soaked shirt for a dry one, or to put on a bra, unless one of
them watched her change her clothes. She declined to do so.
Leaving the baby with Bechman’s husband, Officer Magill handcuffed Bechman, led her to his squad car, and drove her to the jail. At
the jail, Bechman was strip searched and given a body cavity search.
Bechman was detained at the jail overnight—the first time she had
been separated from her nursing infant. The jailers released
138
Bechman the next morning.

Detention itself can often be a very negative experience, as
holding facilities are often crowded, dirty, and potentially dan139
gerous. If an arrestee lacks money for bail—a common occurrence even when it is set at a low amount—the detention can

136. Id. at 1521–22. For more on Florence, see Wayne A. Logan, Florence v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders: Police Power Takes a More Intrusive Turn, 46
AKRON L. REV. 413 (2013).
137. Bechman v. Magill, 745 F.3d 331, 332 (8th Cir. 2014).
138. Id. at 333. For discussion of the personal trauma stemming from
searches of residences based on incorrect address information, see John Sullivan, When the Innocent Are Treated Like Criminals, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
2016, at A1.
139. See, e.g., Robert Patrick & Jennifer S. Mann, Jailed by Mistake:
Wrongful Arrests Jail 100 People for over 2,000 Days, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/special/st
-louis-wrongful-arrests-mount-as-fingerprint-mismatches-are-ignored/html_
b153a232-208f-5d0b-86a1-ba3256f7a941.html; Tom Sharpe, Lawsuit Alleges
Woman Attacked, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (May 12, 2010), http://www
.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/lawsuit-alleges-woman-attacked/
article_fc5710e3-be59-5488-9026-116994d83920.html.
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140

last several days, or for however long the system takes to rec141
ognize its mistake. Being arrested can also have major reputational consequence, resulting in one’s “mugshot” being posted
142
143
on police department and newspaper webpages, and on
144
websites operated by commercial enterprises. And, thanks to
services like ArrestWarrants.org, which relies on “official data
feeds from public and private databases,” and assures that
“[your] searches are not recorded with the government bureaus.
Also, the person’s [sic] searched are not notified in anyway
145
[sic],” your fellow citizens can access any such warrants that
might exist from their home computers.
Arrests, of course, do not establish guilt; indeed, all that
is needed for a lawful arrest is the very modest quantum of
probable cause (a “fair probability”) of involvement in criminal
146
activity. Every year high percentages of the many millions of
147
arrests executed by police do not result in prosecution, much
140. See, e.g., Keila Szpaller, City of Missoula Makes Wrongful Arrests on
Invalid Warrants, MISSOULIAN (Missoula, Mont.) (Jan. 27, 2013), http://
missoulian.com/news/local/city-of-missoula-makes-wrongful-arrests-on-invalid
-warrants/article_2ae40e0c-682b-11e2-90fe-001a4bcf887a.html (“[I]llegal warrants affect the people who are least able to pay a $50 or $200 bond; many
people may not even know that their arrest was improper”).
141. Such is the fate of even the famous. See, e.g., Invalid 1989 Arrest Warrant Detours Ike Turner for Night, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), May 18, 2007,
at A2 (noting the plight of musician Ike Turner, ex-husband of singer Tina
Turner, who at age seventy-five was arrested on the basis of a warrant that
had been recalled in December 1989, and was required to spend the night and
much of the following day in jail).
142. Jess Bidgood, After Arrests, Quandary for Police on Posting Booking
Photos, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/
after-arrests-quandary-for-police-on-posting-booking-photos.html?_r=0.
143. See, e.g., Mugshots Gainesville, GAINSVILLE SUN, http://
mugshotsgainesville.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
144. See, e.g., ARRESTS.ORG, http://florida.arrests.org (last visited Nov. 1,
2016).
145. See ARRESTWARRANT.ORG, http://arrestwarrant.org (last visited Nov.
1, 2016); see also, e.g., GOVWARRANTSEARCH.ORG, http://govwarrantsearch.org
(last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
146. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983); see also Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair
probability’ that the person committed the crime at issue.” (quoting Sherwood
v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997))).
147. See, e.g., Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth
Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 36–41 (2000) (stating that, for example, in
Kings County, New York, “only 33% of felony arrests [from 1990 through 1994]
resulted in felony prosecutions”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1330 (2012) (“In some jurisdictions, prosecutors decline to
prosecute as many as half of all misdemeanor arrests.”).
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148

less conviction. An arrest record, however, has very tangible
effects on individuals, serving as a basis to justify future deten149
tions by police, and fueling a self-perpetuating cycle of crimi150
nal justice system contacts. Arrests not only have direct im151
pact on future criminal justice outcomes, they also adversely
affect employment, housing, occupational licenses, and student
152
loan opportunities. Because inaccurate or incomplete records
are regularly accessed and considered by the private sector,
housing, employment and other critically important matters
153
are jeopardized. In 2012 alone, roughly seventeen million FBI
148. See, e.g., Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, in 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 131, 147 (2007) (reporting a non-conviction rate of eighty-percent for
marijuana in public view (MPV) arrests in New York City from 1992–2003);
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66
STAN. L. REV. 611, 641–42 (2014) (noting that in New York City, less than half
of misdemeanor arrests in 2012 resulted in a conviction of any kind). In 2013,
in California, almost one-third of the over 305,000 adult felony arrests did not
result in a conviction. KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN
CALIFORNIA, 2013, at 49 (2013), http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/
publications/candd/cd13/cd13.pdf.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that knowledge of criminal history can help give rise to probable
cause of current criminal activity); United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537,
542 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that knowledge of prior criminal record can help
create reasonable suspicion of current safety risk justifying a frisk); Commonwealth v. Malone, 366 A.2d 584, 588 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (“An arrest record
may be used by the police in determining whether subsequently to arrest the
individual concerned, or whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal
charges against an individual already arrested.”).
150. For discussion of the long-term effect of arrest on juveniles in particular, see generally Kevin Lapp, As Though They Were Not Children: DNA Collection from Juveniles, 89 TUL. L. REV. 435 (2014); Akiva M. Liberman et al.,
Labeling Effects of First Juvenile Arrests: Secondary Deviance and Secondary
Sanctioning, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 345 (2014).
151. See Besiki Luka Kutateladze & Victoria Z. Lawson, How Bad Arrests
Lead to Bad Prosecution: Exploring the Impact of Prior Arrests on Plea Bargaining, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 973, 976 (2016) (explaining that arrest records
are often considered in pretrial detention decisions, charge offers, and sentencing).
152. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–25,
833–41 (2015); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise,
Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find
-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402.
153. See NEIGHLY & EMSELLEM, supra note 11, at 9–10; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 117, at 20 (“[I]ncomplete records can lead to
negative impacts on the applicant, since the applicant is responsible for obtaining missing information from courts . . . . [W]hen employers have urgent
hiring needs, they may choose another qualified applicant rather than wait for
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background checks were conducted for employment and licensing purposes, yet, an estimated fifty percent of the FBI’s records (provided by states) failed to include final disposition of
154
arrest data, creating what are known as “hanging arrests.”
A recent ethnographic study highlights the personal, human dimensions of criminal history record errors in particular.
Researcher Amy Myrick conducted year-long fieldwork in
which she examined the rap sheets of over 150 adults in a
small midwestern jurisdiction who sought to have their records
155
reviewed for possible expungement purposes. The study subjects typically were unaware that their records were erroneous,
and had a range of negative reactions when they discovered
that they were. “Cliff,” a fifty-seven-year-old African-American
man who was arrested for murder in a round-up and released
without charge the next day, expressed understandable alarm
156
that the record left the impression that he was a murderer.
Others were troubled by entries on their rap sheets that proclaimed in large boldfaced letters under their mugshots that
157
they were “convicted felon[s],” when in reality they were not.
Paula was angry that because there was no legal process to correct
mistakes on rap sheets, which were not authoritative records and
thus not held to standards of accuracy, the police could make what
she saw as a callous mistake without accountability . . . . These clients felt that the record’s ability to carelessly assign them to a category distorted their moral standing, even when the error had no bearing
158
on legal outcomes.

Myrick also recorded many instances where record identities of individuals were conflated “when court records attributed a case to the wrong person, thereby merging their histo159
ries.” Individuals “responded with bewilderment at the many
an individual to gather court records that are needed to complete the FBI record check.”).
154. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 3
(2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf. In Florida
in 2006, only forty-six percent of arrest dispositions were recorded within two
years. SUSAN BURTON ET AL., FLORIDA DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, ASSESSING FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL HISTORY IMPROVEMENT, 2003 AND 2006, at 14
(2009), https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/cms/FSAC/Publications-(1)/PDF/Assessing
-Florida-s-Criminal-History-Iimprovement.aspx.
155. Amy Myrick, Facing Your Criminal Record: Expungement and the Collateral Problem of Wrongfully Represented Self, 47 L. & SOC’Y REV. 73 (2013).
156. Id. at 88.
157. Id. at 89.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 90.
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people who shared similar records,” which occurred when people had similar names, but lacked other identifying information
such as a fingerprints, birthdays or addresses, the comparison
160
of which would serve as ready bases to avert identity error.
Ultimately, Myrick concluded, a criminal record is “a material
proxy that the legal system has composed on its own terms,”
161
yet can remain inscrutable and even unknown to its subjects.
When this is the case, “[w]rongful representation of self is a collateral effect of having a criminal record that is always present,
but usually hidden in a way that is itself inequitable, since
162
most people cannot begin to object.”
Bad data in government-aggregated registries are no less
problematic. Being in a gang member database can result in
163
police detention and harassment. So too can inclusion in a sex
offender registry, as exemplified by the experience of an individual in Massachusetts who was exonerated but his name was
not removed from the registry and who was threatened by police with arrest for not complying with registration require164
ments. Even more troubling, multiple news stories in recent
years recount instances of registry errors resulting in individu165
als being mistakenly targeted by vigilantes. Furthermore, it
takes little imagination to appreciate the negative impact of be166
167
ing arrested, much less convicted, as the result of a DNA
160. Id. at 91.
161. Id. at 102.
162. Id.
163. Rebecca Rader Brown, Note, The Gang’s All Here: Evaluating the Need
for a National Gang Database, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 321 (2009).
164. Sarsfield v. City of Marlborough, Civil Action No. 03-10319-RWZ, 2006
WL 2850359, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 2006).
165. See, e.g., Fredrick Kunkle, Caught in a Neighborhood Web: Innocent
Man Mistaken for Registered Offender, WASH. POST, May 13, 2006, at A1 (reporting on an individual mistakenly targeted by neighborhood-wide e-mail notification when his car license plate was traced by a neighbor to a home at one
time occupied by a registrant); Alex Lyda, Vigilante Beating Raises Questions
About Texas Sex-Offender Registry, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 4, 1999), http://www
.desertnews.com/article/726240/Vigilante-beating-raises-questions-about
-Texas-sex-offender-registry.html/pg=all; W. Paul Koenig, Does Congress
Abuse Its Spending Clause Power by Attaching Conditions on the Receipt of
Federal Law Enforcement Funds to a State’s Compliance with Megan’s Law?,
88 J CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 721, 765 n.113 (1998).
166. See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum & Joseph Goldstein, DNA Match Tying Protest to 2004 Killing Is Doubted, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2012, at A19 (suggesting that DNA contamination may have resulted in a false lead in an open
investigation); Henry K. Lee, How Innocent Man’s DNA Was Found at Killing
Scene, SFGATE (June 26, 2013), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/How
-innocent-man-s-DNA-was-found-at-killing-scene-4624971.php (reporting that
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database error, or as a result of being wrongly included in a
168
gang database.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, database errors
impose major personal harms on individuals. However, it
should not escape attention that data collection, generation and
aggregation can have broader societal consequences. The documented problems associated with “hanging arrests,” for instance, assume added significance when one considers that one
of every three adults can expect to be arrested by the age of
169
twenty-three, and that the ratio increases to nearly one of
170
every two adults among Latino and African-American males.
Arrest warrants themselves, as Justice Kagan recently noted,
are not distributed evenly across the population. To the contrary, they
are concentrated in cities, towns, and neighborhoods where stops are
most likely to occur—and so the odds of any given stop revealing a
warrant are even higher than [than the millions of warrants in databases] . . . . One study found, for example, that Cincinnati, Ohio had
over 100,000 outstanding warrants with only 300,000 residents . . . .
And as Justice Sotomayor notes, 16,000 of the 21,000 people residing
171
in the town of Ferguson, Missouri have outstanding warrants.

Data errors thus can have a disparate impact on poor minority
communities, whose members often suffer comparative disadvantages in detecting and challenging inaccurate records.
an innocent man’s DNA appeared at the scene of a crime due to contamination
by responding paramedics).
167. See About, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
about (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
168. See, e.g., Ali Winston, Bill To Shed Light on California’s Gang Database Moves Forward, REVEAL NEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.revealnews
.org/article/bill-to-shed-light-on-californias-gang-database-moves-forward (describing the vague and undemanding criteria for inclusion in California’s gang
database).
169. Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23
in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012).
170. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest
Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).
171. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2073 n.1 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). As a recent U.S. Department of Justice report highlighted,
courts in Ferguson, Missouri routinely issued arrest warrants based on missed
court appointments and failure to pay fines for very minor offenses such as
parking infractions, and traffic and housing code violations, triggering new
fines and fees, part of a broader strategy of generating revenue for the city.
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 3–4 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_
report.pdf. For further discussion of the tendency of governments to utilize the
criminal justice system to generate revenues, see Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F.
Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175.
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2. On Governments
While data errors most directly affect individuals, they also
have significant negative implications for governments. First,
when a government undertakes a project that not only affects
the public treasury but also risks impinging on the liberty, privacy, and other interests of its citizens, it has the indefeasible
obligation to do its utmost to ensure that is does so in a scrupu172
173
lous manner. Democratic accountability demands no less.
Rather than the old adage “good enough for government work,”
Justice Brandeis’s recognition of the government serving as
174
“teacher” should be operative. If governments collect and
generate sensitive data on individuals, typically with little or
175
no legal or practice constraint, and make it available to law
enforcement and private industry alike, they should not be able
to absolve themselves of responsibility for its content. As the
D.C. Circuit opined almost forty years ago with respect to the
FBI’s collection of criminal justice data from states:
The FBI cannot take the position that it is a mere passive recipient of
records received from others, when it in fact energizes those records
by maintaining a system of criminal files and disseminating the criminal records widely, acting in effect as a step-up transformer that puts
176
into the system a capacity for both good and harm.

Second, data errors and government eschewal of responsibility for them is problematic for other quite practical reasons.
The first is that mistakes undercut the trust among citizens in
the competence and fairness of government. As Peter Shane
has noted, when “the unjustified targeting of innocent persons
become[s] widespread, the very fabric of mutual confidence be-

172. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (“An agent acting . . . in the name of the United
States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser
exercising no authority other than his own.”).
173. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1837 (2015) (“Accountability is primal to American
democracy.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1423 (2011) (“Good information is the
lifeblood of effective governance.”).
174. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.”).
175. See Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391, 417 (2016)
(noting the “traditional monopoly that police departments possess over the evidence of and narratives structuring their behavior on the street”).
176. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d. 1017, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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tween citizen and government . . . [becomes] threatened.” Data errors, moreover, are inefficient. When an individual is mistakenly targeted by police as the result of a bad arrest warrant,
for instance, not only does the individual suffer, but police, correctional, and judicial resources are misdirected. DNA that
should have been expunged clogs an already over-strapped sys178
tem. Likewise, a sex offender registry containing home address errors for registrants misdirects community members’ at179
tention, vigilance, and self-protective efforts.
Academics have vigorously debated the consequences of
greater data availability, weighing individual privacy values
against the social efficiency benefits thought associated with
180
enhanced knowledge about individuals. The knowledge empowerment premise, however, is undercut when the infor181
mation relied upon is inaccurate.
II. BARRIERS TO DETECTING AND REMEDYING DATA
ERROR
Despite the acknowledged prevalence of data error, the law
currently provides little opportunity to detect (much less correct) errors and remedy the harms they cause. This Part surveys this terrain and then examines the array of significant
practical obstacles that stand in the way of revealing the systemic origin and extent of data errors and holding government
accountable for the harms they cause.

177. Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch
Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 808 (2007). For discussion of the critical role
police play more generally in upholding rule of law values and instilling public
trust, and the negative consequences of failing at the enterprise, see Wayne A.
Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 90–92 (2011).
178. Logan, supra note 106, at 282.
179. See LOGAN, supra note 60, at 122.
180. Compare, e.g., Lior Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 371–73 (2008), with Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J.
967, 1035 (2003).
181. Employers, too, are adversely impacted by data errors. See NEIGHLY &
EMSELLEM, supra note 11, at 14 (“[F]aulty FBI records also have a detrimental impact on employers who are often denied timely access to qualified
workers, unnecessarily compounding the difficulty of filling jobs in industries
. . . where there are still significant labor shortages.”).
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A. LEGAL BARRIERS
From the dawn of the digital era, courts have expressed
concern over the negative impact of data error on individuals.
Such concern, however, has not translated into concrete legal
remedies. This Section discusses three primary legal barriers:
due process restrictions, Fourth Amendment limitations, and
immunity provisions.
1. Due Process
In the early 1970s, a series of cases involving erroneous
criminal history records stored by the FBI inspired the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals to examine the due process implica182
tions of data error. In 1974, in Menard v. Saxbe, the court addressed whether the FBI had a duty to purge its database of an
individual’s putative arrest in Los Angeles for burglary, which
California authorities later notified the FBI was actually only a
183
“chance encounter.” After noting that “[t]he disabilities flow184
ing from a record of arrest have been well documented,” and
that “sound principles of justice and judicial administration”
185
warranted relief, the Menard court rejected the FBI’s claim
that it was not responsible for the accuracy of the state crimi186
nal justice records in its database. Although the FBI had no
statutory duty to ensure the initial accuracy of submitted in187
formation, the court stated that “the FBI’s function of maintaining and disseminating criminal identification records and
files carries with it . . . a corollary . . . responsibility to discharge this function reliably and responsibly and without unnecessary harm to individuals whose rights have been invad188
ed.”
Menard concerned the FBI’s duty to expunge a record after
being put on notice of its inaccuracy in a state database. In

182. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
183. Id. at 1029.
184. Id. at 1024.
185. Id. at 1025.
186. See id. at 1022, 1028 (“The FBI retains its arrest records even where
the record indicates that the arrestee was released without being charged,
since it is the FBI’s firm policy that ‘The FBI does not have the authority to
decide which fingerprints submitted by law enforcement agencies should be
returned. Such a decision rests solely with the original contributor of fingerprints.’” (footnote and citation omitted)).
187. See id. at 1026.
188. Id.
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189

Tarlton v. Saxbe, the D.C. Circuit soon thereafter addressed
whether the FBI has “a duty to take reasonable measures to
safeguard the accuracy of information in its criminal files
190
which is subject to dissemination.” The Tarlton court, Judge
Bazelon writing, reaffirmed Menard and espoused “a more
comprehensive view of the FBI’s responsibilities in regard to its
191
criminal files.” Without requiring the FBI to make “reasonable efforts to safeguard the accuracy of the information” it
stored, the FBI “would in effect have the authority to libel” in192
dividuals. “Dissemination of inaccurate criminal information
without the precaution of reasonable efforts to forestall inaccuracy restricts the subject’s liberty without any procedural safe193
guards designed to prevent such inaccuracies.”
Turning to the merits of the case, the Tarlton court rejected the FBI’s argument that its duty was absolved because of a
disclaimer it inscribed on its disseminated records asserting
194
that it was simply a repository of collected information. The
court added, however, that there were “practical limits to the
FBI’s responsibility”; the “FBI is not and cannot be the guaran195
tor of the accuracy of the information in its criminal files.”
The FBI need not, for instance, assess the constitutionality of
an arrest challenged by a litigant or investigate facts giving
196
rise to an arrest. Ultimately, noting the “general nature of
[its] mandate,” the court remanded the matter to the lower

189. 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
190. Id. at 1121.
191. Id. at 1122.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1123.
194. Id. at 1127. The court offered three reasons in support. First, other
entities relying on the record, such as a sentencing court or parole agency,
would not be in a position to review the accuracy of FBI records it received. Id.
Second:
[T]he easy availability of FBI records and the extreme difficulty [faced
by other entities] of obtaining the information on their own make virtually blind reliance on the FBI records a practical necessity. Third,
the subject of the files, often imprisoned and more often without the
intellectual or financial capacity to conduct a personal investigation
into the facts of distant arrests or convictions, will seldom be able to
effectively challenge the accuracy of information distributed by the
FBI before a parole board or sentencing judge.
Id.
195. Id. at 1127–28.
196. Id. at 1127.
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court for elaboration on the “specifics of this general duty of in197
quiry.”
Menard and Tarlton, while predicated on statutory
grounds, offered lofty language of governmental duty motivated
198
by due process concerns. In 1975, this same sensitivity was
199
more plainly evinced in United States v. Mackey, where an officer in Nevada arrested a hitchhiker based on NCIC information indicating that he was wanted in California for a probation violation. A subsequent search of the arrestee revealed a
shotgun, which the defendant sought to suppress when it was
later discovered that the NCIC information had been inaccu200
rate for a period of five months. The court held that the arrest
violated due process:
Because of the inaccurate listing in the NCIC computer, defendant
was a “marked man” for five months prior to his arrest, and, had this
particular identification check not occurred, he would have continued
in this status into the indefinite future. At any time, . . . a routine
check by the police could well result in defendant’s arrest, booking,
search and detention . . . . Defendant was subject to being deprived of
his liberty at any time and without any legal basis . . . .
The Court finds that a computer inaccuracy of this nature and duration, even if unintended, amounted to a capricious disregard for the
rights of the defendant as a citizen of the United States. The evidence
compels a finding that the government’s action was equivalent to an
arbitrary arrest, and that an arrest on this basis deprived defendant
of his liberty without due process of law. Once the warrant was satisfied, five months before defendant’s arrest, there no longer existed
any basis for his detention, and the Government may not now profit
201
by its own lack of responsibility.

The Supreme Court in the early 1970s also showed sensitivity for reputational harms resulting from government action.

197. Id. at 1129. On remand, the trial court was persuaded by the FBI’s
position, concluding that an individual challenging the accuracy of an FBI record must ordinarily first file a request with local authorities, that the FBI
need not indicate the existence of a pending challenge to the record’s accuracy,
and that arrest records without any disposition that are less than a year old
could be disseminated. Tarlton v. Saxbe (II), 407 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (D.D.C.
1976).
198. See Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186, 188 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (“In
Tarlton, the District of Columbia Circuit found that the F.B.I. had some obligation to insure that its criminal records were accurate. This duty, which was
never fully explained in the Tarlton opinion, apparently rested upon constitutional notions of due process and privacy.”).
199. 387 F. Supp. 1121 (D. Nev. 1975).
200. Id. at 1122.
201. Id. at 1124–25.
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The high-water mark was Wisconsin v. Constantineau, where
a local chief of police publicly posted information about the
plaintiff barring her from buying liquor in area stores. In finding such a public shaming to be unconstitutional without proper notice and opportunity to be heard, the Court stated:
Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential. “Posting” under the Wisconsin
Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma, an official branding of a person. The label is a degrading one. Under the Wisconsin Act, a [targeted individual] is given no process at
all. This appellee was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She
may have been the victim of an official’s caprice. Only when the whole
proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person
203
are aired can oppressive results be prevented.

A mere five years later, however, the Court reversed course
204
in Paul v. Davis. There, the Chief of Police of Louisville, Kentucky, printed and distributed to local businesses a photo of the
205
plaintiff with the heading “Active Shoplifters.” The plaintiff,
who had been arrested for shoplifting but not convicted, filed a
civil rights action alleging that his due process rights were violated when he was targeted without first receiving notice and
206
an opportunity to be heard. The Sixth Circuit agreed, relying
207
on Constantineau.
A five-member majority reversed, characterizing the claim
as alleging damage to “mere reputation,” which in itself does
208
not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The
Paul majority reasoned that the plaintiff in effect alleged only
that “the State may not publicize a record of an official act such
as an arrest,” which in itself is not actionable: “[R]eputation
alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to
209
invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.”
In so deciding the Court distinguished Constantineau, saying
that it entailed more than “mere defamation”; the “posting”
there deprived the claimant of a “right previously held under

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

400 U.S. 433 (1971).
Id. at 437.
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
Id. at 695–96.
Id. at 696–97.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 708–09.
Id. at 701, 713.
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state law—the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common
210
with the rest of the citizenry.”
Paul has been widely condemned as an unjustified departure from what appeared to be the unqualified recognition in
Constantineau of a cognizable reputational liberty interest
211
against governmental stigmatization. As Henry Paul Monaghan noted not long after Paul was decided, “in a ‘Constitution
for a free people,’ it is an unsettling conception of ‘liberty’ that
protects an individual against state interference with his access
212
to liquor but not with his reputation in the community.”
Nonetheless, Paul’s “stigma-plus” test remains the law of
the land; to allege a due process violation, a litigant must show
reputational stigma plus some additional tangible harm (such
213
as lost employment). And while Paul did not address whether
government has an obligation to maintain accurate or complete
criminal justice data, as Tarlton suggested, the decision has
214
dashed such hopes. The upshot, as one government report observed, is that “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that the U.S. Constitution is largely neutral with respect to the dissemination of
215
criminal history record information.”

210. Id. at 706, 708.
211. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy
of Paul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 576 (1999) (“Even the most generous
reading of Constantineau compels the conclusion that the holding had virtually nothing to do with a deprivation of the right to buy alcohol and everything
to do with injury to a free-standing interest in reputation.”); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973,
1983–84 (1996) (“The Court characterized the Constantineau opinion as reflecting [an instance in which one had been deprived of something tangible],
but the Court’s characterization was purely historical invention.”).
212. Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405, 426 (1977) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572
(1972)).
213. See, e.g., Rosenstein v. City of Dallas, 876 F.2d 392, 396 n.3 (5th Cir.
1989) (“[C]harges must be connected with the discharge . . . [and] must be
more than merely adverse; the charges must be the type that might seriously
damage the employee’s standing and associations in the community, that . . .
impair his [future] employment opportunities.”); Pruett v. Levi, 622 F.2d 256
(6th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he mere existence of an inaccuracy in the FBI criminal
files . . . is not sufficient . . . to state a claim of a constitutional injury.”).
214. See, e.g., Rowlett v. Fairfax, 446 F. Supp. 186, 188 (W.D. Mo. 1978)
(citing Paul and criticizing Tarlton for suggesting that subjects of criminal justice records possess a protectable due process interest in data quality).
215. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001
UPDATE 45 (Dec. 2001). Furthermore, the report noted, “[c]ommon law privacy
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2. Fourth Amendment
When an individual is stopped or arrested on the basis of a
database error, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unrea216
sonable” searches and seizures is implicated. Although the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the significant negative con217
sequences of arrest, it has afforded police significant latitude
to make mistakes of fact when arresting individuals on the basis of warrants. Police, for instance, can arrest when they reasonably mistake an arrestee for a person who is the subject to a
218
lawful arrest warrant. “Sufficient probability, not certainty,”
the Court stated in in Hill v. California, “is the touchstone of
219
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”
Applying this generous standard, lower courts have upheld
arrests (and thus also searches) of individuals in the face of
strong countervailing evidence of mistaken identity. In Hill v.
220
Scott, for instance, police arrested Brian Arthur Hill on the
basis of a warrant for another Brian Hill, even though the warrant specified a different middle name, birth date, and eye col221
or. The Eighth Circuit, while acknowledging that additional
investigation would have confirmed the petitioner’s claim of in222
nocence and mistaken identity, rejected his Fourth Amendment claim, stating that a “mistaken arrest based on a facially
valid warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officers reasonably mistook the arrestee for the person named in
223
224
the warrant.” In Johnson v. Miller, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Fourth Amendment claim of a white female mistak-

doctrines have also proven to be largely irrelevant to the handling of criminal
history record information.” Id.
216. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (ensuring that “the right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated”).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (describing
an arrest as “a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, . . . disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family
and his friends”).
218. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).
219. Id.
220. 349 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2003).
221. Id. at 1072.
222. Id. at 1073–74.
223. Id. at 1072.
224. 680 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982).
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enly arrested on the basis of a lawful arrest warrant for an Af225
rican-American woman with the same name.
When an individual is wrongly seized on the basis of an invalid warrant the Fourth Amendment calculus understandably
changes. As noted by one court, “[I]f the only justification for an
arrest is an invalid arrest warrant, the arrest constitutes an
226
‘unreasonable seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Here,
too, however, latitude exists for mistakes; as the Seventh Circuit recently put it, “[T]he Fourth Amendment is not a bulwark
227
against typos.” To prevail, an arrestee must establish that police knew or should have known that an arrest warrant was in228
valid (e.g., had been recalled). “The law accepts the risk that
229
in some cases officers may arrest the innocent.”
In the federal civil rights litigation context, under § 1983,
230
states are immune from damages actions, and local governments are liable only if a constitutional wrong results from a
231
232
“policy” or “custom,” a very difficult standard to satisfy. In a
225. Id. at 41–42. In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), the Court
held that while a mistaken arrest based on a facially valid warrant is not itself
a violation, and that police have no duty “to investigate independently” claims
of mistaken identity when arresting, an individual cannot “be detained indefinitely in the face of repeated protests of innocence.” Id. at 144–46. “[D]etention
pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence
will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of ‘liberty
. . . without due process of law.’” Id. at 145. Applying this standard, the Court
was “quite certain that a detention of three days over a New Year’s weekend
does not and could not amount to such a deprivation.” Id. Lower courts have
forgiven far longer periods of continued detention. See, e.g., White v.
Andrusiak, No. 14-7045, 2015 WL 4999492 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015) (eight
months); Echols v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D.
Kan. 2005) (twenty-five days).
226. Pitchford v. Borough of Munhall, 631 F. Supp. 2d 636, 650 (W.D. Pa.
2007).
227. United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 410 (7th Cir. 2014).
228. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 578–79 (4th Cir. 1989);
Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 847 F. Supp. 1414, 1420 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Morales v.
Franklin Cty. Sheriffs, No. 2:12-cv-00580, 2013 WL 6837558, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 23, 2013); Long v. City of Philadelphia, No. 15-00202, 2016 WL 366817,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2016); Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 618 F. Supp. 24, 28
(W.D. La. 1984), aff ’d, 768 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1985).
229. Snyder v. United States, 990 F. Supp. 2d 818, 840 (S.D. Ohio), aff ’d,
590 F. App’x 505 (6th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Finch v. Chapman, 785 F. Supp.
1277, 1278–79 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (plaintiff wrongfully arrested twice based on
erroneous NCIC listing); Rogan v. City of Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (plaintiff arrested five times, three times at gunpoint, based on erroneous NCIC listing).
230. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748–49 (1999).
231. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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few cases over the years courts have allowed claims to proceed
under a “deliberate indifference” theory when governments
have been put on notice of continued egregious database prob233
lems and failed to take corrective action. Most commonly,
however, the very high burden of misfeasance has resulted in
234
denials of claims.
As a result, the principal avenue for redress lies in suits
against individual officers, yet with them qualified immunity
bars relief unless they “knew or reasonably should have known
that the action . . . [taken] would violate the constitutional
rights of the [plaintiff], or if [they] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
235
or other injury.” With arrests based on invalid warrants, police officers enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages liability for false arrest if they are neither aware of nor had reason
236
to know that the arrest warrant was invalid. Immunity is
232. See Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409,
414 (2016) (noting that “[i]t has been roughly three decades since the Court
has ruled that a municipal policy caused a constitutional violation” and that
“[n]egligence, even gross negligence, is not enough to constitute an actionable
municipal ‘policy’”).
233. See Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 847 F. Supp. 1414, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (a
sheriff ’s “knowledge that an effective system to remove quashed warrants
from the database is necessary . . . [combined with a] total failure to take any
of the measures readily available to him to improve the effectiveness of the
system” presented issue of possible deliberate indifference); Ruehman v. Vill.
of Palos Park, 842 F. Supp. 1043, 1054 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff ’d sub nom.,
Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The undisputed evidence
is that there are large numbers of incorrectly listed traffic warrants, that the
Sheriff ’s office had knowledge of this deficiency, and that there was no procedure in place for eliminating incorrect listings. Accordingly, it must be held
that the Sheriff ’s policy in not maintaining accurate records of traffic warrants
was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of persons being subjected to arrests and detention on recalled warrants.”).
234. See, e.g., Noone v. City of Ocean City, 60 Fed. App’x 904 (3d Cir. 2003);
Rubins v. Tisdale, No. 2:12-CV-118-J, 2012 WL 4932159 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17,
2012); Hughes v. McWilliams, No. 04CV7030 (KMW), 2009 WL 4823940
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009); Littlefield v. Viveros, No. 1:06cv1530 OWW DLB,
2007 WL 4284864 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2007).
235. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (citation omitted).
236. See, e.g., Johnson v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Sheriff ’s Department, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 1056, 1060 (D. Neb. 2003) (rejecting the claim yet noting that the
“plaintiff was plainly inconvenienced, embarrassed, and distressed by the result of the defendants’ sloppy electronic record-keeping”); Seals v. Jones, No.
12-cv-569-JED-TLN, 2014 WL 3818280, at *10 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 4, 2014) (finding defendants had qualified immunity for arresting plaintiff on recalled warrant because, at the time, the “arrest of plaintiff on the warrant was objectively reasonable”); Robinson v. City of Denver, No. 12-cv-00483-WYD-KMT, 2014
WL 1395758, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr. 10, 2014), motion to certify appeal denied sub
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withheld only when it can be successfully alleged that a department has a custom or policy of providing incorrect information that results in a “sufficient number of mistaken arrests
237
so as to put the [defendants] on notice” of a database problem.
Given the foregoing, it perhaps should come as no surprise
that database errors, resulting in the securing of incriminating
evidence or contraband, are also insulated from legal challenge.
As noted earlier, when police arrest an individual they can con238
duct a search. In the past, state and lower federal courts were
prone to invoke the exclusionary rule when police seized an in239
dividual based on erroneous database information. The Supreme Court, however, has since adopted a far less generous
position.
The Court’s most recent case on database error, Herring v.
240
United States, involved one Bennie Dean Herring who was
arrested when a neighboring county failed to update its police
nom., Robinson v. City of Denver, No. 12-cv-00483-WYD-KMT, 2014 WL
2499178 (D. Colo. May 29, 2014) (denying summary judgment on defendant
City and County municipality liability claims for failure to train, but concluding that defendant officer and deputies had qualified immunity because arrest
was “objectively reasonable under the circumstances” and there is no established authority that imposes “a duty to further investigate [Plaintiff ’s] claims
of mistaken identity once he matched the identifiers on the warrant, despite
[Plaintiff’s] claims of innocence”); Kelly v. Jones, 148 F. Supp. 3d 395, 401
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Although in reality Plaintiff was not the correct Anthony
Kelly or ‘Izzy,’ that does not negate the fact that Plaintiff’s exact name was
specified in the warrant. The [police] merely executed the warrant, and the
only defect asserted—the absence of a physical description of the person to be
arrested—is not a legal defect where the suspect’s name is set forth.”). But see
Garcia v. County of Riverside, 811 F.3d 1220, 1226–29 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting motion to dismiss because plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to support
due process violations when officers arrested plaintiff on a warrant describing
an individual forty pounds lighter and nine inches shorter than plaintiff).
237. Brock v. Casteel, No. 1:13-cv-01577-DML-TWP, 2015 WL 3439236, at
*8 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2015).
238. See, e.g., supra note 132 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 668 P.2d 761, 765 (Cal. 1983) (“Suppressing the fruits of an arrest made on a recalled warrant will deter future misuse
of the computerized criminal information systems and foster more diligent
maintenance of accurate and current records.”); id. at 768 (“[The] arresting
officer no doubt acted in good faith reliance on the information communicated
to him through ‘official channels,’ law enforcement officials are collectively responsible for keeping those channels free of outdated, incomplete, and inaccurate warrant information. That the police now rely on elaborate computerized
data processing systems to catalogue and dispatch incriminating information
enhances rather than diminishes that responsibility.”). See generally Joan
Teshima, Validity of Arrest Made in Reliance upon Uncorrected or Outdated
Warrant List or Similar Police Records, 45 A.L.R. 4TH 550 (1986).
240. 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
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database with the information that an old arrest warrant had
241
been recalled. Herring moved to suppress contraband discovered after he was arrested on the basis of the invalid war242
rant. A five-member majority of the Court held that the exclusionary rule was inapplicable, reasoning that exclusion was
warranted only when needed “to deter deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring
243
or systemic negligence.” Exclusion is justified only “[i]f the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant
system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the
244
groundwork for future false arrests.”
Herring is notable for many reasons in re-shaping the ex245
clusionary rule doctrine, but for purposes of this article, the
decision makes clear that the exclusionary rule is not available
246
for ordinary police database errors. Systemic or recklessly
generated errors might provide exclusionary relief, but for rea247
sons discussed later proving this can be extremely difficult.
The Herring majority, moreover, seemingly deemed it important that the database error was “attenuated” from the un248
lawful arrest, but did not specify how or why this was the
249
case. Nonetheless, to the extent that Herring’s arrest was
thought attenuated inasmuch as the data error emanated from
250
another jurisdiction, the increasingly multi-jurisdictional nature and use of databases even further undercuts the possibil251
ity of exclusionary rule relief. In practical effect, forgiving da241. Id. at 136.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 144.
244. Id. at 146.
245. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the
New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 638 (2014).
246. Herring, 555 U.S. at 146 (“We do not suggest that all recordkeeping
errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary rule. In this case, however, the conduct at issue was not so objectively culpable as to require exclusion.”); id. (“In a case where systemic errors were demonstrated, it might be
reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable warrant system.”).
247. See infra notes 251, 273–274, 285–86 and accompanying text.
248. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137.
249. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.6(i) (5th ed. 2012).
250. See id. nn. 211–19 (identifying this as one of several possible bases to
describe an arrest as “attenuated”).
251. Herring itself involved a decidedly modest technological, twojurisdictional scenario: a sheriff in one county telephoning the sheriff’s department in an adjoining county (in the same state) to ask if Herring was subject to an arrest warrant there. Herring, 555 U.S. at 698. For an example of a
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tabase error by another jurisdiction (e.g., another state, city or
252
county) serves to “launder” or “wash” evidence.
Herring itself built upon Arizona v. Evans, a case involving
253
a traffic stop of Isaac Evans. The arresting officer ran Evans’
name through his police computer and discovered an outstand254
ing misdemeanor arrest warrant. The warrant, however, had
actually been quashed and Evans moved to suppress the con255
traband recovered incident to his mistaken arrest. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to a
clerical error attributable to court staff because “the exclusion
of evidence at trial would not sufficiently deter future errors [by
256
police] so as to warrant such a severe sanction.”
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, highlighted the danger associated with error in data-driven systems:
Widespread reliance on computers to store and convey information
generates, along with manifold benefits, new possibilities of error, due
to both computer malfunctions and operator mistakes . . . . [C]omputerization greatly amplifies an error’s effect, and correspondingly intensifies the need for prompt correction; for inaccurate data can infect
not only one agency, but the many agencies that share access to the
257
database.

The majority’s limitation of the exclusionary rule, Justice Ginsburg observed, coupled with qualified immunity, left those ag-

recent decision attaching importance to multi-jurisdictional circumstances see,
for example, Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 2010) (citing Herring and
rejecting application of exclusionary rule when Indiana police relied on NCICbased existence of Alabama felony arrest warrant that turned out to be invalid). For discussion of the many strategic benefits of multi-jurisdictional task
forces, often allowing end-runs of procedural requirements and limits, see
Wayne A. Logan, Dirty Silver Platters: The Enduring Challenge of Intergovernmental Investigative Illegality, 99 IOWA L. REV. 293 (2013).
252. See Kay V. Levine, Jenia I. Turner & Ronald F. Wright, Evidence
Laundering in a Post-Herring World, 28–31 (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2558737 (citing and discussing multiple post-Herring decisions
in which this occurred).
253. 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
254. Id. at 3.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 14.
257. Id. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The use of general warrants to search for evidence of violations of
the Crown’s revenue laws understandably outraged the authors of the Bill of
Rights . . . . The offense to the dignity of the citizen who is arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because some bureaucrat has
failed to maintain an accurate computer data base strikes me as equally outrageous.”).
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258

grieved by data errors with little recourse. Individual officers
benefit from immunity for negligent errors, government entities are not liable for the negligent acts of employees, and
“identifying the department employee who committed the error
259
m[ight] be impossible.” Rounding matters out, the Supreme
Court has made clear that redress under § 1983 is not available
if a judgment for the plaintiff would “imply the invalidity of his
260
conviction.”
3. Statutory Immunity
Finally, it is not uncommon for state law to expressly afford governmental bodies and their agents immunity for database error. In Ohio, for instance, an individual can dispute the
“accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness of personal
261
262
information,” and recover damages for harm caused, but only if the harm results from “intentionally maintaining” information that is known or reasonably should be known to be “in263
accurate, irrelevant, no longer timely, or incomplete.” Even
264
then, Ohio exempts criminal justice actors from civil liability.
Sex offender registration and community notification laws
afford another instructive example. State-operated websites
that disseminate identifying information on registrants very often prominently display statements disclaiming responsibility
265
for the accuracy of their information. Meanwhile, state laws
258. Herring, 555 U.S. at 156 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
259. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
260. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); see, e.g., Weaver v.
Geiger, 294 F. App’x 529, 533 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that defendant’s § 1983 claim based on arrest with invalid warrant “amounts to the
kind of attack on the factual basis for a conviction that we have deemed impermissible under Heck”).
261. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.09(A)(1) (West 2016).
262. Id. § 1347.10(A).
263. Id. § 1347.10(A)(1).
264. Id. § 1347.04(A)(1); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-35(c) (West 2016)
(providing state actors shall not “be responsible for the accuracy of information
disseminated nor have any liability for defamation, invasion of privacy, negligence, nor any other claim in connection with any dissemination . . . and shall
be immune from suit based upon such claims”).
265. See, e.g., Florida Sexual Offenders and Predators, FLA. DEP’T. OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT, http://offender.fdle.state.fl.us/offender/homepage.do;jsessionid
=jJbeUsuovC7v3UxxrnUWoTXc (last visited Nov. 2, 2016); ST. OF OR. SEX OFFENDER INQUIRY SYS., http://sexoffenders.oregon.gov (last visited Nov. 1,
2016). For-profit entities that display arrest information likewise offer accuracy disclaimers. See, e.g., Daryl Nelson, Mugshot.com and UnpublishArrest
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as a rule bar civil or criminal liability for registry information
266
disseminated in the absence of wanton or willful misconduct,
267
gross negligence or bad faith. Governments and their agents,
moreover, are insulated from liability for the acts of third parties who cause harm to registrants as a result of information
268
that is released. In Florida, the state and local governments
and their agents are “presumed to have acted in good faith in
compiling, recording, reporting, or releasing the [registrants’]
information. The presumption of good faith is not overcome if a
technical or clerical error is made . . . in compiling or providing
269
[such] information.” In many states, civil liability is barred
270
outright without qualification. And courts have rejected legal

.com: Partners in Crime Info?, CONSUMER AFFAIRS (Dec. 17, 2012), https://
www.consumeraffairs.com/news/mugshotcom-and-unpublisharrestcom
-partners-in-crime- info-121712.html.
266. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3827(I) (2016); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-258(b) (West 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-53(3) (West 2016);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-511 (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651B:7(V) (2016).
267. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-920(a), (b) (West 2016); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11 § 4121(l)(1) (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-719
(West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-520(A) (2016); see also GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-12(q) (West 2016) (“Law enforcement agencies, employees of law enforcement agencies, and state officials shall be immune from liability for good
faith conduct . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-8 (West 2016); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 692A.123 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.547 (West 2016); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4012 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 584(P)
(West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 163A.065 (West 2016); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9799.31 (West 2016); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-37.1-17 (West
2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24B-32 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39206(c) (West 2016); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 62.008 (West 2016); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 5412 (West 2016). Idaho requires malice or intentional misconduct. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8325(3) (West 2016).
268. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-258(b) (West 2016) (stating the
government and its officers shall not be “held civilly liable to any registrant by
reason of disclosure of any information regarding the registrant that is released or disclosed”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3797.12(A) (West 2016) (listing
the category of persons who shall be immune from civil liability “for injury,
death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by an act or omission in
connection” with registration law).
269. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(9) (West 2016).
270. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.850(2) (West 2016) (stating
employees and officers of a law enforcement agency or the Central Repository
enjoy immunity from civil or criminal liability for “[t]he accuracy of information in a record of registration” without mention of negligence or bad faith);
see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4911 (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A
§ 11252 (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-11A-8 (West 2016).
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and moral responsibility of governments for community vigi271
lantism.
B. PRACTICAL BARRIERS
In the event that the aforementioned legal barriers do not
outright preclude relief, a variety of significant and likely insuperable practical obstacles can stand in the way. In Herring, for
instance, the five-member majority required proof of “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circum272
stances recurring or systemic negligence,” placing the burden
273
on plaintiffs to establish the record. Similarly significant evi274
dentiary challenges face civil plaintiffs.
271. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1280 (2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that community notification is “doubtless the ‘but for’ cause of some”
vigilantism, but rejecting that the acts are attributable to notification per se);
State v. Williams, 728 N.E.2d 342, 357 (Ohio 2000) (“It cannot be presumed
that the receipt of public information will compel private citizens to lawlessness.”). For extended criticism of this laissez-faire sentiment, see Wayne A.
Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 188–89
(2000).
272. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). Professor LaFave
observes that the Herring majority references both “systemic negligence” and
“systemic errors,” which arguably carry varied meanings. The former, he
writes:
[P]resumably refers to a variety of negligence that has an effect upon
an entire recordkeeping system. Such is the case . . . [in] “an environment in which negligent management and oversight created conditions” permit[ ] the specific error to occur. Thus it would seem that if
a false entry in law enforcement records or failure to discover same is
fairly attributable to a lack of sufficient management or oversight,
then the case would not fall within the Herring exception. The same
would appear to be true if either the making of the error or the failure
to detect it is related to some other “systemic” problem, such as the
manner in which the recordkeeping system at issue has been structured.
LAFAVE, supra note 249 (citations omitted). LaFave adds that what qualifies
as “systemic error,” however, “is far from clear. Certainly the reoccurrence of
the same kind [of] error for some time without any effective response would
seem highly relevant, and perhaps the length of time that a specific error remained uncorrected is also significant—although Herring indicates that
length of time must exceed five months!” Id. (citation omitted).
273. See Jöelle Anne Moreno, Rights, Remedies, and the Quantum and
Burden of Proof, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 89, 98–99 (2015). Whether this should be the
case is questionable, for as Professor LaFave persuasively argues, in Herring
police acted without a warrant (at least a legal one), a context in which it has
been customary for the government to shoulder the burden of proof. LAFAVE,
supra note 249. On the question of good faith, moreover, “in the past courts
have consistently ruled ‘that the government has the burden to prove facts
warranting application of the good faith exception.’” Id. (citation omitted). Cf.
United States v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964 (11th Cir. 1985) (subscrib-
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Data collected, generated, and stored by governments in
massive databases—aided by commercial entities—presents
275
obvious practical difficulties for individuals. Ex ante detection
of database error, as Professor Kenneth Karst noted fifty years
ago, “depends on the subject’s access to his own file and his
awareness of the need to inspect it. Even when a record is
freely accessible to its subject, there is no assurance that the
276
subject will know of its existence or its contents.” Establishing that error is “recurring or systemic”—a standard that has
277
gone undefined —poses very substantial challenges of its own.
As Professor Erin Murphy recently observed:
[T]he faulty products of a database can go entirely unnoticed under
current doctrine even when they are common and recurring. Consider
the debate in Herring itself: the majority demanded evidence that the
database routinely produced bad information, refusing to consider the
absence of quality control mechanisms itself a sufficient “harm.” Yet a
database that generates bad information—say, that falsely reports
arrest warrants—may produce many arrests, but little record of those
arrests. Unless the arrested person sues civilly, or is found in violation of contraband (as in the case of Herring), no formal record of the
278
error may be made.

Justice Sotomayor, dissenting this past term in Utah v.
279
Strieff, echoed this concern. In Strieff, the Court held that
even though an initial seizure of a defendant was unlawful the
arresting officer’s discovery of a “small traffic warrant” in a database served to “attenuate” the connection between the initial
unlawful seizure and the evidence secured as a result of the ar-

ing “to the common law guide that the party in the best position to present the
requisite evidence should bear the burden of proof ”).
274. See supra notes 230–37 and accompanying text.
275. See Solove, supra note 180, at 1035 (“The general progression from
information collection to processing to dissemination is the data moving further away from the individual’s control.”).
276. Kenneth L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls over the Accuracy and
Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 358
(1966); cf. United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 997 (7th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that it is “difficult for a litigant to establish” that a magistrate has
functioned as a “rubber stamp” in issuing search warrants).
277. See, e.g., McCain v. State, 4 A.3d 53, 65 (Md. App. 2010) (barring relief
because officers’ detection of database error “[m]aybe once out of the month”
did not qualify as “‘systemic negligence’ necessary to trigger imposition of the
exclusionary rule”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 249 (criticizing the lack of
clarity in defining “systemic negligence”).
278. Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 823 (2010).
279. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
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280

rest. In response to the majority’s contention that the officer
did not engage in a “dragnet search” or “part of any systemic or
recurrent police misconduct,” and that the illegal stop and da281
tabase search was an “isolated instance of negligence,” Justice Sotomayor wrote that the majority did “not suggest what
makes this case ‘isolated.’ . . . Nor d[id] it offer guidance for how
a defendant can prove that his arrest was the result of ‘widespread’ misconduct. Surely it should not take a federal investigation of Salt Lake County before the Court would protect
282
someone in Strieff’s position.”
In the litigation context, procedural obstacles can also limit
the ability of individuals to gain access to evidence. Courts, for
instance, typically require that a defendant seeking an eviden283
tiary hearing must make a “colorable claim,” which lies only
when “the moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that
284
contested issues of fact . . . are in question.” Likewise, given
the meager opportunity for expert assistance and for discovery
in criminal cases more generally, little room exists to hire fo285
rensic computer experts to examine database error, making
even the theoretic availability of a claim in Justice Ginsburg’s
286
words “an empty promise.” Finally, as experience has shown
in the context of individuals eligible for expungement of DNA

280. Id. at 2064.
281. Id. at 2058, 2063–64.
282. Id. at 2068; cf. Ferguson, supra note 245 (discussing the need for trial
lawyers to memorialize in trial records information regarding systemic or recurrent constitutional violations).
283. See, e.g., United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 424 (3d Cir. 1994).
284. United States v. Watson, 404 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 1979)); cf. United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (denying defendant’s discovery request
in selective prosecution claim because he “failed to show that the Government
declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races”).
285. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 278, at 283 (“It is not as though there
are procedures in the criminal justice system for a defendant to implead Applied Biosystems in order to gain access to primer sequences used for forensic
DNA typing—the only option is an awkward fumble with the jurisdiction’s
rules of discovery. And given the Sixth Amendment’s parsimonious view of
criminal discovery, there is no guarantee that those rules will suffice.” (citation omitted)).
286. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven when deliberate or reckless conduct is afoot, the Court’s assurance will often be an empty promise: How is an impecunious defendant to
make the required showing?”).
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287

profiles wrongly retained by governments, and the paucity of
288
requests to correct erroneous records, individuals do not act,
289
whether for resource, time, or expertise reasons. And, even
when this is not the case, an individual can be barred from assessing the accuracy of a database, such as with gang database
290
information that is deemed “confidential.”
Technology also provides a significant practical barrier to
remedy error. Data is often shared, replicated, backed up and
stored in many different databases at once. Even if a data error
is corrected, this does not guarantee that other shared datasets
will reflect the change. Especially as federal and state law enforcement continues to share real time information on many
thousands of individuals, catching all of the errors will be diffi291
cult. Furthermore, many data corrections do not simply delete information but merely overwrite it. So, if a warrant is erroneously issued for John Fox Smith, when the warrant should
read John Hare Smith, the court can quash the erroneously issued warrant. But, under John Fox Smith’s digital record there
292
will also likely be a quashed warrant. While this erroneous
digital record is less damaging that an active—yet invalid—
warrant, the fact that John Fox Smith is in the system with a
past warrant might impact how police treat him. If a private
company publicizes individuals with active warrants and posts

287. See Wayne A. Logan, Government Retention and Use of Unlawfully
Secured DNA Evidence, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 269 (2015).
288. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, RESPONSES OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
ARISING FROM THE MARCH 30, 2011 HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY REGARDING FBI OVERSIGHT 9–10 (Dec. 6, 2011) (noting
that in 2010 just over a thousand requests were made).
289. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Myth of Arrestee DNA Expungement, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 51 (2015), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1157&context=penn_law_review_online; cf. JACOBS,
supra note 16, at 140–41 (noting that “rap sheet” errors “can be corrected if the
record-subject finds out about errors and has sufficient persistence and competence to pursue the remedial process, but those are big ifs”).
290. CMTY. JUSTICE PROJECT, UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS SCH. OF LAW, EVALUATION OF GANG DATABASES IN MINNESOTA & RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
5 (2009).
291. On this difficulty more generally, vis-à-vis massive government databases, see Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011,
1047 (2014).
292. Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search of
a Right, in Need of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REV. 755, 802 (2005).
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John Fox Smith’s information on the Internet, the official cor293
rection will do little to salvage his reputation.
Then there is the plight of South Carolina resident Kendra
Speed. Speed, a registered nurse who had never been convicted
of a crime, learned that she had been branded as a prostitute
by California authorities, a fact that came to light after she was
294
fired from a job as the result of a background check. The mistake stemmed from a data entry error when a woman with the
same first and last name was arrested and failed to appear in
court. After trying unsuccessfully to rectify matters long distance, Speed was forced to fly to southern California. A local
judge immediately withdrew the warrant and issued another
warrant for the actual prostitution arrestee, who had a different birth year and a distinctly different middle name. Contemplating legal action against the Riverside County District Attorney’s office, Speed was told that prosecutorial immunity
295
296
would likely preclude suit. And, it usually does.
Finally, research has shown that even when successful, individual lawsuits typically have little tangible value in redress297
ing misconduct by criminal justice system actors or the sys-

293. See, e.g., James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use,
and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177,
207 (2008); Meg Leta Ambrose et al., Seeking Digital Redemption: The Future
of Forgiveness in the Internet Age, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 99, 116 (2012); Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An
Overview of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1342 (2005).
294. Brett Kelman, Falsely Branded a Prostitute, Woman Had To Fix It
Herself, USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation-now/2015/11/16/prostitution-charge-clerical-error/75889020.
295. Id.
296. See generally Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A
Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 510
(2011) (“[P]rosecutorial misconduct is a significant problem; it leads to a substantial number of wrongful convictions; and our system lacks effective mechanisms to deter or remedy prosecutorial misconduct.”).
297. See David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2183 (2005) (describing a variety of obstacles precluding
municipal liability); Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police? 16 (Jan.
6 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2711980 (noting obstacles, including low likelihood of counsel to
bring cases in the absence of significant monetary awards, that combine to
limit liability even when proof of wrongdoing is strong); see also id. at 18
(“[E]ven when a civil rights plaintiff prevails in a damages action, that success
will create minimal leverage [for reform] because damages awarded very rarely have any financial impact on officers or the departments that employ
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298

tem as a whole. Litigation in criminal justice, moreover, is
well known to be under-inclusive. As Professor Erin Murphy
has observed:
[A] database that generates bad information—say, that falsely reports
arrest warrants—may produce many arrests, but little record of those
arrests. Unless the arrested person sues civilly, or is found in violation of contraband (as in the case of Herring), no formal record of the
error may be made. And even if formal suits are filed, it may be difficult to link them to one another as the product of a faulty database.
The only proof of the reliability of the database in Herring itself were
the statements of its keepers—hardly disinterested parties—and yet,
299
even those were contested factually.

In other instances, the causal link between data error and individual harm suffered will remain invisible, such as when an inthem.”); cf. Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role
of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023,
1079–80 (2010) (citing studies showing that law enforcement is often left uninformed about court decisions to suppress evidence or dismiss cases as a result
of unconstitutional behavior).
Even if an individual can sue there is no guarantee that the agency that
can correct the error will do so, or that the error, if removed, has been completely eradicated. In Minnesota, for instance, a woman sued the State Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) for failing to remove her name from a conviction record that resulted from an identity theft when another woman used her
name as an alias when convicted. Hannah Allam, St. Paul Victim of ID Theft
Sues BCA, SAINT PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 23, 2002, at 1B. The BCA confirmed the mistake but refused to remove the information from its database,
asserting that it needed to keep the information on file in the event the thief
attempted to use the alias again. Id. The BCA agreed to provide the plaintiff a
letter that she could present to potential landlords or employers stating the no
convictions could be found based on a search of her name, date or birth, and
fingerprints. Id.
298. See generally Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000). Perversely, in turn, without major litigation payouts, the salutary role at times played by private insurance providers in hastening policy changes is absent. See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers
Regulate Public Police (Feb. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733783.
299. Murphy, supra note 278, at 823; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, What
Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 863 (2012) (citing evidence showing that individuals believing they have been illegally searched or
seized by police bring suit only roughly one percent of the time and providing
possible explanations for low filing rate). Also, without even the threat of litigated liability, there is a lack of pressure for reform from public entity liability
insurers, who are instrumental in motivating criminal justice actors to change
their way of doing things. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay:
Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144 (2016); see also
id. at 1203 (noting that most large, self-insured jurisdictions pay settlements
and judgments with no financial consequences for law enforcement agencies
that engaged in wrongdoing).
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accurate criminal history record results in an individual not
300
even being interviewed for a possible job. The next Part
makes the case for how broader structural and institutional
improvements, combined with increased opportunity for legislative redress, can help better ensure data quality.
III. ENHANCING DATA QUALITY AND ENDING DATA
IMPUNITY
The varied forms of database error that can arise in the nation’s sprawling criminal justice system preclude any one-fit solution. What is needed, and what this Part seeks to do, is the
development of a systematic approach to ensuring criminal justice data quality and management, dedicated to identifying and
correcting errors ex ante, complemented by legal opportunity
for redress when data error harms come to fruition.
A. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO ENHANCE DATA QUALITY
We begin with an overview of government efforts to promote data quality control and accountability, which have mainly emanated from federal initiatives dating back to the early
1970s. We then turn to a review of current criminal justice data
quality control mechanisms among states, and, finding them
wanting, propose new ways to improve data quality and accountability.
1. Federal Efforts
Federal awareness of the need to improve the quality of
state and local criminal justice data dates back to the early
301
1970s, a time when courts and policy makers alike evinced
concern over data errors and government responsibility for
302
them. In 1973, as part of an amendment to the Omnibus

300. NEIGHLY & EMSELLEM, supra note 11, at 9–11.
301. See supra notes 182–201 and accompanying text.
302. As a deputy director of the Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement
and the Administration of Justice stated in testimony before Congress: “It is
necessary that all criminal justice agencies, including courts and corrections,
assume responsibility for completeness and accuracy of criminal offender record information. . . . [Complete and accurate records are] essential, not only to
protect individual rights, but also as a tool of criminal justice planning, management, and evaluation.” Criminal Justice Data Banks—1974, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights on S.2542, S.2810, S.2963, S.2964,
93d Cong. 293, 296–97 (1974) (testimony of Richard W. Velde, Deputy Administrator for Policy Development Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).
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303

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress mandated that all federally funded state and local criminal records
repositories maintain records that are complete and accurate,
but failed to specify data quality standards. Three years later,
the Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) issued regulations providing more specific
304
guidance on operational procedures, which have been added
to over the years.
The current version of the Code of Federal Regulations
provides that “[i]t is the purpose of these regulations to assure
that criminal history record information wherever it appears is
collected, stored, and disseminated in a manner to ensure the
accuracy, completeness, currency, integrity, and security of
305
such information and to protect individual privacy.” With regard to completeness, records must contain information on any
disposition within ninety days after the disposition has oc306
curred, and agencies must query the state central repository
prior to disseminating any criminal history record information
to help ensure that the agency has the most recent data availa307
ble. With respect to accuracy,
criminal justice agencies shall institute a process of data collection,
entry, storage, and systematic audit that will minimize the possibility
of recording and storing inaccurate information and upon finding inaccurate information of a material nature, shall notify all criminal
308
justice agencies known to have received such information.

Audits are to be conducted on an annual basis, focusing on a
“representative sample of State and local criminal justice agencies chosen on a random basis” to verify adherence to regula309
tion requirements. Finally, federal regulations require that
states provide individuals the right to access and review for accuracy and completeness their criminal history records, and be
310
afforded an opportunity to make corrections.

303. 42 U.S.C. § 3789g(b) (1973) (codified as amended by Crime Control Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-83, § 524(b), 87 Stat. 197).
304. 28 C.F.R. §§ 20.20–.25 (1977).
305. 28 C.F.R. § 20.1 (2015).
306. Id. § 20.21(a)(1).
307. Id. The regulations provide for two exceptions where the requirement
is dispensed with: when the agency is sure that the criminal history is the
most recent available or when time is of the essence and when the repository
is incapable of responding within the necessary time period. Id.
308. Id. § 20.21(a)(2).
309. Id. § 20.21(e).
310. Id. § 20.21(g).
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Federal laws and regulations also impose standards on
states participating in the Interstate Identification Index, a national fingerprint-based criminal records system operated by
the FBI that indexes individuals arrested for felonies or mis311
demeanors. Today, all states participate in the system by contributing their records, affording them critically important ac312
cess to criminal records nationwide. The Code of Federal
Regulations provides that “[i]t shall be the responsibility of
each criminal justice agency contributing data . . . to assure
that information on individuals is kept complete, accurate, and
current so that all such records shall contain to the maximum
extent feasible dispositions for all arrest data included there313
in.”
Federal law also prescribes standards for state operation of
a federally funded “criminal intelligence system,” used by
states in monitoring individuals they believe to a have “reason314
able possibility” will engage in organized criminal activity.
States must:
[A]dopt procedures to assure that all information which is retained by
a project has relevancy and importance. Such procedures shall provide for the periodic review of information and the destruction of any
information which is misleading, obsolete or otherwise unreliable and
shall require that any recipient agencies be advised of such changes
which involve errors or corrections. . . . Information retained in the
system must be reviewed and validated for continuing compliance
with system submission criteria before the expiration of its retention
315
period, which in no event shall be longer than five (5) years.

Over time, the federal government has also been notably
generous in the funding that it has provided states to create
and operate their databases. The Department of Justice,
through the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP),
have dispensed millions of dollars in grants to state and local
agencies to improve criminal justice system data quality. The
National Criminal History Improvement Program, initiated by
BJS in 1995, is tasked with helping states “improve the quality,
timeliness, and immediate accessibility of criminal history rec316
ords and related information.” From 1995 to 2015 the Pro311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

See id. § 30.
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 154, at 15.
28 C.F.R. § 20.37 (2015).
See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
28 C.F.R. § 23.20(h).
National Criminal History Improvement Program, U.S. BUREAU OF
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gram allocated approximately $633 million in awards to state
317
and local governments to this end. The NICS Improvement
Amendments Act of 2007 authorized additional state grants for
states and Indian tribes to “supply accurate and timely information to the Attorney General concerning final dispositions of
318
criminal records to databases accessed by NICS.” Funds also
flow to states under the auspices of the Edward Byrne Law Enforcement Program, a main federal criminal justice funding
source for states, which provides that grants may be used for
319
“information systems for criminal justice.”
From the outset, federal largesse has not been unconditional; it has hinged on states satisfying federal requirements.
For instance, federal law provides that any state failing to satisfy regulations regarding criminal history records is subject to
civil penalty (albeit only $11,000) and the federal government
“may initiate fund cut-off procedures against recipients of [fed320
eral] assistance.” Federal regulations governing the Interstate Identification Index, the national fingerprint-based index
of criminal records, provide that a state’s access to the system
“is subject to cancellation” for failure to uphold its responsibility to “assure that information on individuals is kept complete,
321
accurate, and current.” Finally, continued funding for and
state participation in the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC) is conditioned on states satisfying the many federally
322
prescribed data quality guidelines and requirements. With
JUST. STAT. (Sept. 17, 2016), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47.
317. Id.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2015).
319. Pub. L. No. 109–162, s. 1111, 119 Stat. 3094 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3751). Between 1990 and 2005, federal law mandated that five percent of the
Byrne Act funds received by states be dedicated to improvement of their criminal records systems. The mandate was discontinued in 2005. Id.
320. 28 C.F.R. § 20.25. In addition, grant application instructions for the
National Criminal History Improvement Program provide that:
Applicants are strongly encouraged to develop or update long-range
record improvement plans to assess quality and completeness issues
and identify gaps in record reporting and availability with the goal of
developing strategies to significantly reduce or eliminate these gaps.
Such plans should include ongoing research, analysis, data quality
auditing, or similar work that can set quantifiable improvement goals
and monitor performance achievement.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 2016 NATIONAL
CRIMINAL HISTORY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (Apr. 2016), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/nchip16sol.pdf.
321. 28 C.F.R. §§ 20.37–.38 (2015).
322. See id. §§ 20.20, .21, .25; see also FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCIC
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DNA, the federal government makes state participation in the
National DNA Index System (part of CODIS) contingent upon
satisfaction of federally prescribed quality assurance standards
323
(demonstrated by audits), and other requirements.
2. State Efforts
As a result of federal prodding, by 1984 all states had laws
in place regarding criminal justice record data quality con324
325
trol, which have been augmented over the years. The practical effect of these provisions, however, remains very much in
question. While it is fair to say, as a recent report by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office asserts, that states have
326
327
shown “progress,” especially with respect to automation,
328
data quality remains a major problem. State audit practices
329
have been and remain deficient. Today, only thirty-seven
330
states even nominally require them, and the rigor and scope
331
Moreover, only thirty-nine
of audits varies considerably.

OPERATING MANUAL (rev. 2000) (on file with authors); NAT’L CRIME INFO.
CTR., FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USER AGREEMENT (2000) (on file with authors).
323. See Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION [hereinafter FAQs on CODIS and NDIS] https://www.fbi
.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last
visited Nov. 2, 2016).
324. B.J.S., DATA QUALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORDS, supra note 6,
at 35.
325. See U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF STATE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION: 2002 OVERVIEW (2003) [hereinafter B.J.S.,
COMPENDIUM] (surveying state laws).
326. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL HISTORY
IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM: FEDERAL GRANTS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO PROGRESS
3 (2004).
327. Id.
328. See supra notes 103–29 and accompanying text.
329. See Doernberg & Zeigler, supra note 6, at 1152 n.226 (“Although
states receiving federal funds are now required to conduct audits annually. . . .
[I]t appears that this requirement is honored in the breach . . . .”). In 2001,
twenty-three state criminal history repository directors reported that their databases had not been audited for completeness in the prior five years. Over
half reported that they had not planned or scheduled a data quality audit to
occur within the next three years. Overall, twenty-four states did not plan to
do an audit within the three-year time frame. Of the twenty-seven states with
completed audits after 1995, changes were made to improve data quality as a
result of twenty-two of the audits. B.J.S., IMPROVING ACCESS, supra note 6, at
13.
330. B.J.S., COMPENDIUM, supra note 325, at 7.
331. Id.
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states have laws designed to address disposition reporting to
332
their state records repository and only twenty-eight states
had taken steps to create a standardized “rap” sheet that com333
plies with federal recommendations.
The stubborn reality remains that states lack incentive to
self-police and, in the absence of pressure from the federal government, they will not take steps to do their utmost to ensure
data quality. As one government report put it over thirty years
ago: “States must be committed to put into place—and practice—procedures to collect and maintain complete and accurate
data, and to scrupulously and regularly conduct systematic au334
dits to ensure compliance with those procedures.” The next
section charts a way forward toward achieving these goals.
B. TOWARD DATA QUALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
1. Federal Enforcement of Data Quality Standards
The first step toward data quality and accountability is to
recognize that the status quo in place since the mid-1970s,
marked by generalized aspirational standards, lax institutional
controls, and poor or non-existent accountability, must change.
To date, there has been no shortage of federal studies chronicling state data quality deficiencies and procedural shortcom335
ings, nor has there been a lack of well-intentioned federal
336
support.

332. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, at 6 (2014).
333. Id. at 7.
334. B.J.S., COMPENDIUM, supra note 325, at 8–9; see also B.J.S., DATA
QUALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORDS, supra note 6, at 60 (“Roundtable
participants felt that many agencies have not made an adequate commitment
to data quality and that national efforts to highlight and prioritize data quality concerns were perhaps the most effective way to encourage agency commitment to the effort.”).
335. See, e.g., B.J.S., IMPROVING ACCESS, supra note 6; NAT’L CONSORTIUM
FOR JUSTICE INFO. AND STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASKFORCE ON
THE CRIMINAL BACKGROUNDING OF AMERICA (2005); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 08-898R, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS FUNDING TO
STATES TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL RECORDS (2008); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-15-162, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: CRIMINAL
HISTORY RECORDS: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS COULD ENHANCE THE COMPLETENESS OF RECORDS USED FOR EMPLOYMENT-RELATED BACKGROUND CHECKS 39
(2015) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS].
336. See supra notes 303–23 and accompanying text.
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What has been lacking is federal resolve to police the
states. Since the early 1990s, for instance, states have been allotted multiple millions of dollars to create and operate sex offender registration and community notification systems, yet to
date it does not appear that the federal government has ever
sanctioned a state for the acknowledged inaccuracies in registries. A similar story can be told with gang databases that operate with known errors and without significant accountabil337
ity, and state participation in the FBI-operated DNA profile
338
database (NDIS). So too with the National Crime Information
Center (NCIC), despite states and localities expressly agreeing
to satisfy data quality requirements also based on “User
339
Agreements” executed with the FBI, there has been no effort
340
to enforce this mandate.
To end data impunity, federal enforcement mechanisms
must be actually enforced; state data quality can no longer be a
341
funded but unenforced federal mandate. Reason to think that
such a change in federal resolve is perhaps at hand is found in
a highly critical report issued by the U.S. Attorney General,
which concluded that, after some thirty years of federal regulatory effort and funding, “the federal commitment to improving

337. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., S.C. LAW ENF. DIV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SYS. (CJIS), User Agreement and System Responsibilities (Mar. 5, 2008) (on file with authors).
340. Further evidence of weak federal resolve is found in the scenario
played out with the FBI’s Advisory Policy Board, which includes representatives from federal, state, and local criminal justice agencies. The Board created
a Disposition Task Force in 2009 to address ways to address continued problems with missing disposition information among other issues. The task force,
however, “has not issued best practices or national standards for collecting
and reporting disposition information or developed a national strategy for improving the quality of disposition reporting, as intended. Establishing a plan
with time frames and milestones could help the task force achieve its remaining goals and help improve disposition reporting.” REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, supra note 335.
341. For discussion of lax federal monitoring of the Office of Justice Programs grantee compliance more generally see, for example, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: PROBLEMS WITH GRANT
MONITORING AND CONCERNS ABOUT EVALUATION STUDIES (2002) (statement
of Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director, Justice Issues). See also Rachel A. Harmon,
Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 889–
90 (2015) (citing studies addressing monitoring and assessment inadequacies
in federal initiatives directing criminal justice funds to states).
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[state] record systems now needs to be rethought and reinvig342
orated.” In particular:
[T]o achieve uniformity in improvements across the nation, we believe
that it is time to rethink [the] approach of allowing states to spend
the money as they think necessary within broadly defined program
goals. We believe that federal funds should now be more directly targeted at reaching specific goals for uniform record completeness and
343
accuracy nation wide.

To that end, the report offered eight recommendations, including the establishment of a “national accreditation process
for criminal history record repositories, much the same way
that crime laboratories are accredited, to better ensure data
344
quality by measuring repository performance.” With national
accreditation standards, satisfied within prescribed timelines,
no longer would record quality standards be voluntary, result345
ing in overall increase in quality and uniformity.
This more exacting federal role could make use of already
existing data quality control measures. One tool could be the
Records Quality Index, created by the Bureau of Justice Statistics to enable the Bureau to assess the quality of state records
346
and identify areas of particular deficiency, created for use in
347
NCHIP funding decisions but never deployed. “Similar to how
342. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 154, at 126; see also id.
(“Much more needs to be done to achieve uniformity in the improvement of
record quality and completeness . . . .”).
343. Id.
344. Id. at 131.
345. ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 154, at 131.
346. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, IMPROVING CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORDS FOR BACKGROUND CHECKS, 2005 at 6 (2006) [hereinafter B.J.S., IMPROVING CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS FOR BACKGROUND CHECKS].
347. As noted in one Bureau of Justice Statistics report:
A State’s RQI can be compared to the RQI of other States to determine the relative strength of the State’s criminal history record system. The RQI will also allow for more specific analysis, permitting
BJS to track the progress of a State by the score received on each of
its performance measures. The overall RQI a State receives can be
compared to a national average to express whether the overall efficiency of the State’s criminal history record system meets, exceeds, or
is below the impartial summary of all States. After complete data are
received, the RQI will become an invaluable tool for identifying the
strengths and weaknesses of each State’s criminal history record system. Using RQI information, NCHIP will target funds to activities
that will most significantly improve a State’s RQI, thereby improving
national background check systems more directly and quickly.
B.J.S., IMPROVING ACCESS, supra note 6, at 16. For more on the RQI, see
JAMES M. TIEN ET AL., MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
RECORDS SYSTEMS: THE RECORDS QUALITY INDEX (2005).
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the Dow Jones Industrial Average may be used to gauge the
performance of the overall stock market, the [Index] . . . characterizes the performance of the States’ criminal history record
systems toward achieving the goals of the Federal records im348
provement programs.”
Audits can and should play a key role in this effort. Auditing, as a recent BJS report recognized, “is generally viewed as
349
one of the most effective data quality procedures.” In the private sector, large and small companies regularly conduct audits
of their operations for data quality control purposes. In the
health care records context, for instance, insurers conduct data
audits to detect fraud, focusing on: (1) data completeness; (2)
data accuracy; (3) inconsistencies in data records; (4) implausi350
bility in light of other data; and (5) data currency. Each of the
contexts surveyed earlier are amenable to and would benefit
351
from audits. Audits should be conducted as often as possible,
but at least once a year. For guidance, states can look to procedures contained in a recently issued federal government report
detailing comprehensive audit procedures for states to employ
in auditing their federally funded “criminal intelligence sys352
tems.”
Institutionalizing effective audit procedures will not only
promote government accountability and help avoid the negative
348. B.J.S., IMPROVING CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS FOR BACKGROUND
CHECKS, supra note 346.
349. B.J.S., COMPENDIUM, supra note 325, at 7; cf. Mariano-Florentino
Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 231–40
(2006) (advocating audits of agency discretionary decisions to see how well
they adhere to decision-making norms); Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due
Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 829 (2007)
(“Effective internal quality control requires regular sampling of records, presumably on a random basis, to determine whether information is accurately
recorded, whether the information is properly linked to the appropriate government response (e.g., visa denial, intensified airport inspection, etc.),
whether information about individuals is consistent where it appears in multiple databases, and whether inclusion of each record is consistent with the
governing standards and required decision procedures.”).
350. Nicole Gray Weiskopf & Chunhua Weng, Methods and Dimensions of
Electronic Health Record Data Quality Assessment: Enabling Reuse for Clinical Research, 20 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 144, 145 (2013).
351. With arrest warrant databases, for instance, a simple algorithm could
be devised to highlight individuals with the same or similar first and last
names that can create record confusion. See YU & DIETRICH, supra note 124,
at 19.
352. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PRIVACY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES: AUDIT GUIDANCE FOR THE STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL, AND TERRITORIAL INTELLIGENCE COMPONENT (2015).
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353

consequences resulting from data error. Audits will also help
smoke out errors ex ante and avoid the harms caused when
they go undetected (e.g., those adversely affecting employment,
354
housing opportunities). At least as important, with reliable
audit data, individuals who are the victim of data error will
have a more realistic chance of showing “systemic” database de355
ficiency sufficient to put government actors on notice. Ultimately, with effective regular audits, we hopefully will not see
a repeat of the facts in Herring where the local county clerk
variously testified that “several times” there had been problems
with invalid arrest warrants and later stated that there had
356
been no problems, yet the State of Alabama, even with an
audit mechanism in place, reported a thirteen percent error
357
rate in its databases.
The federal government must also do a better job of enforcing particular data quality requirements that now exist. With
DNA databases, for instance, federal regulations require that if
states are to remain entitled to access DNA profiles stored in
358
CODIS, which has become a critically important database resource for law enforcement that all states avail themselves of,
they must permit expungement if a donor’s conviction is overturned or charges are dismissed and satisfy data quality proto359
cols and requirements. However, a review of state laws on
expungement makes clear that this requirement is too often
honored in the breach, without any apparent impairment of
360
their continued participation. Moreover, the FBI, which is
charged with the responsibility of conducting spot audits to ensure data quality and compliance with federal procedures, has
audited only a handful of the over 190 state and local entities
providing uploaded DNA profiles; even so, the effort has revealed an average error rate of six percent of entries, which has
361
to date failed to spur meaningful corrective action.
353. See supra notes 130–81 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
356. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 n.5 (2009).
357. Id. at 154.
358. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(c) (2012) (“Access to the index . . . is subject to
cancellation if the quality control and privacy requirements . . . are not met.”).
359. See FAQs on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 323.
360. Logan, supra note 287, at 282.
361. See MURPHY, supra note 278, at 139–41. Professor Murphy notes that
because states can be denied the right to participate in and have access to
DNA profile data in CODIS, the federal government can use “an incredible
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Getting the federal government to act thus remains key. As
it happens, a model exists that affords reason to think that a
change can come about in this regard. Just as the federal government has for decades relied upon states for criminal justice
data, and funded their efforts ostensibly subject to regulatory
oversight, it has asked states to implement federal environmental laws and provide enforcement data, and allocated funds
362
conditioned on satisfaction of federal requirements. The Environmental Protection Agency, like the Department of Justice
363
vis-à-vis its oversight of criminal justice data, has express authority to withdraw state delegated authority, in instances of
deficient state performance. Withdrawal can result either by
EPA initiative or a petition by citizens or other interested par364
ties.
To date, the “nuclear option” of federal termination of state
365
involvement has yet to actually occur. Even so, as Professors
Hammond and Markell note in a recent article, the regulatory
structure in place has often resulted in constructive improve366
ments in state performance. While the EPA has very rarely
367
initiated a withdrawal proceeding on its own, it has on occa368
sion threatened withdrawal. Petitions by outsiders, however,
have been filed with some frequency, and resulted in the EPA
working with states to address deficiencies in their administra369
tion of environmental programs.
In the environmental context, the threat of total withdrawal has been and remains, not especially credible. As Pro-

stick—or offer[ ] a juicy carrot—to nudge laboratory compliance in a particular
direction.” Id. at 284.
362. See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 15–16 (2003) (noting inter alia the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
363. See supra notes 303–23 and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 145.34(b), 271.23, 123.64 (2014) (specifying
withdrawal for CWA).
365. See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for
Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 313, 350–51 (2013).
366. Id. at 350–53.
367. Id. at 341.
368. Id. at 332 n.112.
369. Id. at 336–37, 351–53; see also id. at 353 (“[O]ur results as to substantive outcomes overall are remarkable because they run counter to the typical
account of the potential for withdrawal, which dismisses it as meaningless because withdrawal itself is so rare.”).
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fessor Krotoszynski has observed, the EPA simply lacks the resources to take over state programs, recounting how in one instance the EPA “reacted with abject horror” to a state proposal
to return a portion of a part of a major environmental program
and “negotiated a last-minute deal with the [state] to abort the
370
return process.” With criminal justice data, while the loss of
data from individual states would disserve national law enforcement goals, the consequences pale compared to the immediate peril of states withdrawing from enforcing environmental
371
laws. As important, states would be acutely aware that they
have a lot to lose if federal funds were cut off and/or they were
barred from participating in national criminal justice databases.
As the research of Professor Hammond and Markell makes
clear, however, affording a petition right to non-agency actors
is key: “[T]hat interested parties rather than the agency itself
can trigger the [withdrawal] process provides political cover to
[the] EPA. Because it must respond to petitions to withdraw, it
can use the mere fact of a petition to take a close look at how a
372
given state is performing and to press the state for changes.”
If Congress were to permit a right to petition the Department
of Justice, vis-à-vis state failures to satisfy criminal justice data
quality standards, similar dividends could accrue.
Drawing a page from the playbook of environmental enforcement might seem inapt, yet important parallels exist to
the criminal justice context. Much as the EPA is charged with
certifying states as qualified to implement federal environmen373
tal laws, and monitoring state performance, DOJ has been
tasked with certifying state criminal justice records systems
374
and policing data quality control. In both contexts, moreover,
the accuracy and timeliness of state-provided data is a very
370. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the
Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1637–38 (2012). But see Brigham Daniels, Environmental Regulatory Nukes, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1505, 1552 (noting that while
agency sanctioning of states, including loss of funds, for non-compliance is
comparatively rare, “even when regulatory nukes are not launched, the threat
of launch can still be leveraged for regulatory gain”).
371. Hammond & Markell, supra note 365, at 358.
372. Id.
373. See id. at 357–58.
374. See supra notes 303–13 and accompanying text; see also 28 C.F.R.
§§ 20.21–20.23 (regulations operative in the 1970s requiring that states submit for department approval their Criminal History Improvement Plans).
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375

significant concern and the EPA and DOJ both face significant challenges in monitoring performance due to deficiencies
376
in state-produced data. Recommendations and demands for
improved state criminal justice data have long fallen on deaf
377
ears, yet the EPA and the states have made some progress in
378
devising common metrics to assess state compliance, allowing
379
for more reliable national data and inter-state comparisons.
380
For instance, with a Records Quality Index, suggested above,
the DOJ would be able to create state “report cards,” imposing
381
public pressure on states to improve data quality.
As further incentive, financial penalties could play a greater role. Federal law, for instance, currently imposes a nominal
382
$11,000 civil penalty, which could be significantly increased,
and one could imagine a scalable civil penalty system with high
damage awards corresponding with higher data error rates or
disappointing “report cards.” Making such changes would both
encourage the federal government to police state data quality
375. See David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005)
(noting with respect to data provided to the EPA that “[t]here have been
enormous problems with states’ data entry in terms of the sufficiency of the
data collected, data accuracy and reliability, and the timeliness of data entry”).
376. See, e.g., EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 12-P-0113,
EPA MUST IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF STATE ENFORCEMENT, 11–15, 32 (2011)
(noting that EPA oversight of states presents a “management challenge” due
inter alia to inconsistent and incomplete data provided by states); see also
NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS: HOW
EPA AND THE STATES CAN IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE INFORMATION 33 (2001) [hereinafter EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS] (“EPA and the states should emphasize their commitment to
the initial accuracy of data . . . [by] establishing consistency checks and other
automated systems that will minimize debates over data accuracy.”).
377. See supra notes 324–34 and accompanying text.
378. SHELLEY H. METZENBAUM, STRATEGIES FOR USING STATE INFORMATION: MEASURING AND IMPROVING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 46–47 (2003).
379. See EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, supra note 376, at 26
(“[T]hese data discrepancies point out that it is very difficult to aggregate state
data, to compare performance across states, or to draw nationwide conclusions
on enforcement efforts using current state data.”); see also Markell, supra note
375, at 32 (noting the “challenge of getting fifty state governments to cooperate on an enormous array of basic elements, including adoption of common
definitions, use of the same methodologies, and the like”).
380. See supra notes 346–48 and accompanying text.
381. Cf. RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 362 (noting that a withdrawal proceeding “represents a public statement by EPA that the state’s program is entirely inadequate. The prospect of being branded in this way might
well serve as strong motivation to state officials”).
382. 28 C.F.R. § 20.25 (2015).
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and inspire states to act to protect themselves from financial
liability.
Ultimately, it is hoped, states will look upon the foregoing
changes as a window of opportunity for constructive change,
not simply another instance of federal intrusiveness. The database systems of today will not be those of tomorrow, and if policymakers build in system accountability and quality control
now, it can be part of the technological architecture of the fu383
ture. If future technological adaptions prioritize the ability to
audit and correct for data error, and if future systems are designed to guard against data error, next generation systems
will provide accountability not currently available. One way to
help ensure that states avail themselves of advanced technologies is to tie access to national databases and federal funds to
their acquisition.
2. State Legislative Action
Pressuring states to institutionalize quality control mechanisms, while of critical importance, is not enough to ensure
the kind of vigilance needed. State legislative action is needed.
At the most basic level, a statutory remedy must exist for
individuals to detect and demand correction of data error. Already, a right typically exists in state law to review one’s criminal history record. If error is detected and the government fails
384
to take corrective action, civil penalties, and sometimes even
385
criminal sanctions, can apply. However, it is often the case
that jurisdictions fail to comply with the requirement that individuals be told of their right to challenge and correct their crim-

383. Emblematic of the synergy of data and technology, police in Texas
make use of license plate information, collected and provided by a private
company in the business of locating cars subject to repossession, to detain individuals with outstanding warrants, mostly for minor offenses. Eric
Dexheimer & Tony Piohetski, Local Police Use of Vast License Plate Database
Raises Privacy Concerns, MYSTATESMAN (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www
.mystatesman.com/news/news/local-police-use-of-vast-license-plate-database
-ra/nqSQj. The private vendor providing the plate information receives a twenty-five percent fee that is tacked onto any fine collected. Id.
384. See, e.g., ARIZ. STAT. § 39-121.02 (2012) COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72305(7) (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.490(3) (2015); VA. CODE § 9.1-132(A)(B)
(2014); WASH. CODE REV. § 43.43.730(1) (2015); see also Soderlund v.
Merrigan, 955 A.2d 107, 113–14 (Conn. Ct. App. 2008) (surveying cases allowing for cause of action based on view that failure to correct record is a ministerial action not subject to immunity).
385. MO. REV. STAT. § 109.180 (2015).
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386

inal history records. Beyond the criminal history context the
prospects for relief are even less clear. Gang databases, for instance, might be subject to a “purge” policy but research shows
387
that such policies are deployed sporadically at best. A similar
scenario has played out with government retention of DNA pro388
files required by state law to be expunged.
Seemingly alone among the states, Illinois provides for a
cause of action allowing for redress in instances of negligent
criminal history records. The Illinois Crime Conviction Information Act endeavors to “ensure the accuracy and completeness of conviction information” and “establish procedures for
effectively correcting errors and providing individuals with redress of grievances in the event that inaccurate or incomplete
389
information may be disseminated about them.” The Act seeks
“to make government agencies accountable to individuals in the
390
collection, use and dissemination of conviction information.”
To those ends, the Act requires that regular audits be under391
taken, and allows relief for “negligent dissemination of inac392
curate or incomplete conviction information,” defined to in393
Individuals can
clude arrests, charges, and dispositions.
394
secure compensatory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, as
well as statutory award of up to $1000 if information is not cor395
rected in a timely manner.
396
Ramos v. City of Peru illustrates the law in operation. In
Ramos, the petitioner was arrested for domestic abuse and a
397
booking photo was taken by local police. Several months later
a “Crime Stoppers” bulletin appeared in the local newspaper,
386. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, supra note 335, at 30–31.
387. Hufstader, supra note 69, at 680–81. With the “Terror Watch List,”
sixty-seven percent of errors detected were not corrected by the FBI; in seventy-two percent of closed cases, FBI failed to timely remove targeted individuals. AUDIT DIV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION
PRACTICES iv–v (2009), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf.
388. See Logan, supra note 287.
389. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2635/2(B) (2016).
390. Id. 2635/23(B).
391. Id. 2635/21.
392. Id. 2635/14(B)–(C).
393. Id. 2635/3(F).
394. Id. 2635/15(A). Attorney fees are not to exceed the “actual amount of
monetary damages awarded to the plaintiff.” Id. 2635/16(B).
395. Id. 2635/15(A).
396. 775 N.E.2d 184 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002).
397. Id. at 186.
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displaying the petitioner’s photo, next to the name of another
individual with the same last name, and indicating that the individual was wanted by police for the offense of aggravated
398
sexual abuse. Petitioner sued the local government under the
Act, but his claim was dismissed by the trial court on the rationale that only the state was liable for disseminated infor399
mation. The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
that local governments were subject to the Act and that the
photo came within the definition of “conviction information”
400
under the Act. “To find otherwise,” the Ramos court concluded, “would go against the Act’s mandate that individuals be afforded the maximum feasible protection to their rights of priva401
cy and enjoyment of their good name and reputation.”
Illinois’ adoption of a negligence standard, though surely
more demanding of government, is otherwise not without precedent in the law. Notably, the Federal Torts Claims Act has
been interpreted to allow relief for negligently maintained gov402
ernment records. A statutory cause of action could, if a state
so wished, be subject to a statutory damages cap. But the existence of such a remedy, combined with the availability of attorneys’ fees, would afford jurisdictions added incentive to ensure
that institutionalized quality control measures are kept in
mind and satisfied.
While enhancing the wherewithal of individuals to secure
relief is important, a broader institutional mechanism is needed to ensure that states internalize data quality control
measures. Building on our earlier recommendation regarding
audits, and the enhanced transparency and accountability they
allow, we urge that there be created a specific cause of action,
filed by an individual or entity, to oblige remedial action when
“systemic or recurring” data quality issues become apparent.

398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 187.
401. Id. at 188 (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2635/23(A)).
402. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2012); see,
e.g., Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1280–81 (3d Cir. 1974) (recognizing a negligence action for failing to keep accurate employment records as
cognizable under the FTCA); Doe v. United States, 520 F. Supp. 1200, 1203
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“[H]aving determined that plaintiff in the instant action has
a maintainable claim under the FTCA for the Government’s negligent record
keeping, we need not consider whether or not any separate and distinct claims
he might have brought would have been barred by one or more of the [FTCA]
exceptions.”).
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The framework derives from the Supreme Court’s limitation of
403
the exclusionary rule in Herring, but the legal remedy can
stand independent of any exclusionary rule analysis. Building
off the successful model of affording an “agency-forcing” private
cause of action to force agency performance of nondiscretionary
404
duties, an individual or entity should be allowed to seek injunctive relief forcing system improvements, as well as nominal
damages and attorney fees to incentivize the private bar to act.
In devising a statutory scheme, significant definitional
questions would need to be addressed. For instance, what if the
challenged harm stems from a database outside the jurisdiction
405
where the challenged harm occurred? In Menard v. Saxbe,
the D.C. Circuit quite reasonably cast a critical eye toward the
federal government’s effort to evade responsibility, rejecting the
FBI’s claim that it was not responsible for the accuracy of the
state criminal justice records in its database. Although the FBI
had no statutory duty to ensure the initial accuracy of submit406
ted information, the court stated that the “FBI’s function of
maintaining and disseminating criminal identification records
and files carries with it . . . a corollary . . . responsibility to discharge this function reliably and responsibly and without unnecessary harm to individuals whose rights have been invad407
ed.” States and localities, as the Menard court said of the
FBI, should not be able to “take the position that [they are] a
408
mere passive recipient of records received from others.”

403. See supra 240–252 and accompanying text.
404. See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1982) (discussing “private rights of
initiation” by the beneficiaries of public rights for failure to enforce regulatory
requirements); see also Robert L. Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits To Enforce Nondiscretionary Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353
(2004).
405. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
406. See id. at 1023 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970)).
407. Id.
408. Id. Illinois, for its part, allows for a “good faith” defense of reliance in
a damages action. See 20 ILL. CODE § 2635/15(C) (2015) (“[A] State agency, a
unit of local government, and the officials or employees of a State agency or a
unit of local government may in good faith rely upon the assurance of another
State agency or unit of local government that conviction information is maintained or disseminated in compliance with the provisions of this Act.”). The
good faith defense is not available, however, with respect to equitable or declaratory relief. Id.
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3. Judicial and Local Involvement
State legislative action and executive branch enforcement
of data quality measures do not exhaust the array of options
available.
Courts can certainly play a role. As noted at the outset,
409
courts often presume that a government database is accurate,
which can be outcome determinative in cases challenging the
410
constitutional reasonableness of the actions of police. Typically, such presumptions are based simply on the accepted courthouse premise that errors in fact are not commonplace, a perhaps understandable perception based on the judicial system’s
case-by-case adjudicative model. As Andrew Crespo has observed, however, the modus operandi can blind trial courts to
“systemic facts,” which evidence broader problems such as the
probative accuracy of police representations of probable cause
in search warrant applications and the failure of prosecutors to
411
turn over required exculpatory evidence. The model can usefully extend to databases. While ex ante detection and audits
might be beyond the competence and recourse wherewithal of
state and local court systems, monitoring and tracking the occurrence of error in cases they adjudicate would not.
Courts can also take a more proactive approach to promoting data quality. For instance, they can engage in what John
Rappaport recently called “second-order regulation,” creating
incentives for policymakers, rather than undertaking “firstorder regulation” by means of common law or constitutional
412
rulemaking. To incentivize data quality and government accountability, courts could adopt the position that unaccredited
413
databases lose their presumption of reliability. As Professor
Erin Murphy has similarly suggested:
409. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
410. See, e.g., O’Bryan v. State, 464 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).
411. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional
Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2069, 2092 (2016).
412. John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103
CAL. L. REV. 205, 209–12 (2015).
413. See Murphy, supra note 278, at 823–24 (“[T]he presumption of regularity means that, absent affirmative evidence that a database is kept in a
shoddy or substandard fashion, courts will assume the soundness of the information generated. Notably, this presumption seems to hold even when information about the procedures or practices governing the collection and
maintenance is lacking, either because the record was not developed factually
or because the oversight structures for the database are entirely informal.”
(internal footnote omitted)).
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[C]ourts can require that the database undergo regular, demonstrably
effective auditing processes, and ask to see proof of such. They can
view the absence of information about the database—such as how often it is used, how often it is audited, what the results are—as a sign
that the database is inadequately attended, rather than as confirma414
tion of its reliability.

State courts can also reject the Supreme Court’s decision in
Herring, which allows police to rely on faulty databases in the
absence of proof showing that they were “reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or . . . have knowingly made false entries
415
to lay the groundwork for future false arrests.” State courts
are free to go their own way based on their own state constitu416
tions, as several courts have done, reflecting the common ju417
dicial position before Herring.
Local criminal justice system actors can also facilitate
change. One strategy would be for local police departments to
adopt rules requiring officers to double-check whether an arrest
418
warrant is valid before executing a custodial arrest. In Com414. Id. at 832.
415. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009).
416. See, e.g., State v. Shannon, 120 A.3d 924, 934 (N.J. 2015) (“This case
involves an unconstitutional seizure of a man who had secured relief eighteen
months earlier from his outstanding arrest warrant. His constitutional right
to be free of that unreasonable seizure trumps the subjective good faith reliance by the police on the unpurged, but in fact vacated, arrest warrant . . . .
[T]he inevitable result will cause people to be more careful—a laudatory effect
on all state actors.”).
417. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. Better yet, state legislatures can enact provisions expressly limiting law enforcement use of criminal
justice data that is secured contrary to law, such as is the case in several
states with DNA profiles. See Logan, supra note 287, at 281–82. Courts have
been reluctant to exclude evidence in the absence of an express statutory requirement. See George E. Dix, Nonconstitutional Exclusionary Rules in Criminal Procedure, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, pt. II (1989); see, e.g., State v. Emerson, 981 N.E.2d 787, 793–94 (Ohio 2012) (“Since the General Assembly opted
not to provide a remedy to a party wronged by a violation of [the expungement
laws], ‘we are not in the position to rectify this possible legislative oversight by
elevating a violation of [these statutes] to a Fourth Amendment violation and
imposing the exclusionary rule.’” (quoting State v. Jones, 902 N.E.2d 464, 468–
69 (Ohio 2008))).
418. See, e.g., RECORDS ADMIN., OLYMPIA POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER
82.1.10 (2010), http://www.codepublishing.com/WA/Olympia/opd/OlympiaOPD
82/OlympiaOPD8201.html; CHAMPAIGN POLICE DEP’T, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 74.3.1 (2009), http://ci.champaign.il.us/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/CPD
-Policy-Manual.pdf; PEORIA POLICE DEP’T, POLICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL:
POLICY 4.23 ARREST PROCEDURES 2, at pt. IV.A.4 (2007), https://www.peoriaaz
.gov/PoliceDepartment/administration/docs/policy_manual/4.23Arrest
Procedures.pdf; TRURO POLICE DEP’T, LEGAL PROCESS 3, at 6.D.3.a. (2001),
http://www.truropolice.org/on%20line%20manuals/legal%20process.pdf.
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419

monwealth v. Maingrette, the Massachusetts Court of Ap420
peals attached dispositive importance to such a policy. The
failure of a Boston police officer to follow this double-check process prompted the court to invalidate Maingrette’s arrest, re421
sulting in suppression of evidence recovered by police. Such a
protocol would go a long way toward heading off the trauma
422
experienced by individuals such as Albert Florence and Chel423
who were taken into custody and strip
sea Bechman,
searched when police relied on their mistaken beliefs that valid
arrest warrants existed. Or that of Nicholas Bowen, who, despite having a judge certify an arrest warrant as invalid, and
having a letter attesting to the fact, was nonetheless subjected
to arrest on multiple occasions over the course of several years,
with the final incident involving his being dragged in handcuffs
more than forty feet when in the hospital while recovering from
424
hernia surgery.
***
Ultimately, the foregoing changes, while critically important, will not suffice. A change in mindset is needed. Data
425
error must be re-conceptualized as a systems problem. Errors

419. 20 N.E.3d 626 (Mass. Ct. App. 2014).
420. See id. Such a requirement also preconditions arrests based on a warrant in the NCIC. See NAT’L CRIME INFO. CTR., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic (citing section 1.2(2) of the NCIC
Operating Manual).
421. Maingrette, 20 N.E.3d at 632–33. The court added that:
Under the standard in Herring, it appears that the exclusionary rule
would still apply to the case at bar because here the sole source of the
error, unlike the situation in Herring, was the failure of the police officers making the arrest to comply with an almost twenty year old department policy requiring them to check the [system] before making
that arrest.
Id. at 631 n.5.
422. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
423. Bechman v. Magill, 745 F.3d 331 (8th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Assoc.
Press, Teen Dead Following Arrest on Invalid Warrant in Seattle, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 23, 2007 (seventeen-year-old arrested, despite his
showing police paperwork confirming that arrest warrant had been quashed
the previous day, who while in custody experienced a seizure and died); Lynn
Porter, Teenager Jailed for 9 Days on Invalid Warrant, Charges from N.C.
Had Been Dropped, TAMPA TRIB., May 25, 2002, at A6 (teen arrested on two
occasions, based on invalid out-of-state warrant, despite being presented with
evidence that warrant was no longer valid).
424. Alan Feuer, Cleared of a Crime but Hounded by a Warrant, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), http://nytimes.com/2016/03/29/nyregion/cleared-of-a
-crime-but-hounded-by-a-warrant.html.
425. See generally James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Crim-
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should not be conceived of and excused as isolated mistakes. In
a system with millions of constituent parts, human actors, and
426
no central locus of accountability, error is unavoidable.
Learning how, why, where and how often errors occur can provide the knowledge basis to lessen their incidence, and allow
governmental agents to be on the lookout for their eventual occurrence. But this is not all that is necessary. Big questions on
the front end must be asked about the types of data that need
to be collected, recognizing that the information will be used for
other purposes. For instance, databases contain records of millions of arrests, significant proportions of which are known to
not result in prosecution, or which otherwise lack disposition
427
information. All arrests, however, stigmatize and have major
negative consequences for individuals. The choice to record arrests forever is a choice of the system, which carries with it ineluctable risk of error.
Similar concerns arise with the collection of DNA or other
biometric information. Recognizing the inevitably of data error
should militate in favor of a more circumscribed approach, both
in terms of volume and retention, including use of sunset provisions, which automatically purge data after a set period of
years. For personal data like DNA, this would forestall a concern of a massive government DNA database containing biological information. For associational data like gang lists, this
might make practical sense as gang affiliation may be less relevant years later. In both cases, sunset provisions and purges
will minimize error because significantly less data will populate
criminal justice data systems, preserving only current and relevant data.
IV. OBSTACLES AND RESPONSES
The preceding sections proposed several ways to advance
the cause of data quality and to end data impunity. One cluster
of reforms urges a broad institutional strategy and the other
inal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010) (suggesting that errors in the criminal justice system should be conceptualized as “organizational
accidents”); J. Reason, The Contribution of Latent Human Failures to the
Breakdown of Complex Systems, in 327 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON 475, 475 (1990) (discussing high-risk technologies
and focusing on accidents arising from a combination of systemic errors).
426. See James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in the Criminal Justice System: Sentinel Event Reviews, in MENDING JUSTICE: SENTINEL EVENT REVIEWS
3, 4 (Sept. 2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247141.pdf.
427. See supra notes 112–19 and accompanying text.
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more targeted statutory changes. As with any ambitious solution, feasibility concerns need to be addressed.
As a threshold matter, we need to assess why, despite continued federal awareness of state data inadequacies, the federal
government has not sanctioned states for noncompliance. A
large academic literature exists on the possible reasons behind
federal agency inaction in such situations. At least three stand
out as causal explanations for the decades-long stasis operative
here.
The first is the bureaucratic reality that slashing state
funds could well result in a corresponding decrease in federal
agency operating budgets, sending a tangible signal to Congress of decreased agency fiscal need—something that no agen428
Second, in a variation of Professor
cy head relishes.
429
Wechsler’s famous conceptualization, the states as political
430
safeguards of administrative federalism could be at work.
States wield significant political influence within federal executive agencies, making the latter reluctant to police state non431
compliance. Third, as Professor Rachel Harmon has noted,
parts of the Department of Justice, including the Office of Justice Programs and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, key players

428. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzer, For-Profit Public Enforcement,
127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 872 (2014) (“[L]ike all individuals and institutions,
agencies become accustomed to a certain budget level—a ‘standard of living,’
so to speak.”).
429. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954).
430. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57
DUKE L.J. 2023, 2075 (2008) (“Numerous factors, such as congressional oversight, federal officials’ ties to state regulators, lobbying by state political organizations, and dependence on state implementation, can all serve to give
state regulatory interests leverage in federal agency decisionmaking.”); Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L.
REV. 953, 979–84 (2014). But see Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and
the Failed Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993
(2010) (discussing federal agency indifference to state concerns regarding implementation of federal sex offender registration and community notification
provisions).
431. As Shelley Metzenbaum, former EPA associate administrator for Regional Operations and State/Local Relations, observed in the context of federal
oversight of state enforcement of federal environmental regulations: “Federal
agencies that set goals for or measure the performance of states often find
themselves in testy territory. For both political and practical reasons, states
resent efforts by the federal government to influence their goals and their performance levels.” METZENBAUM, supra note 378, at 69.
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here, are “subject to political influence that is likely to be fa432
vorable to law enforcement interests.”
Finally, quite pragmatic reasons could explain federal unwillingness to police data quality in the states. For instance,
concern might exist, that ramped up federal enforcement of
standards will encourage states to “go off the grid,” as seemingly has occurred to some extent with DNA databases, as several
local governments, unwilling to abide by even the specter of
more rigorous federal guidelines, have partnered with private
433
entities to create their own databases. Nor can one discount
the fact that the federal government, while unhappy with state
quality control efforts, may prefer to have substandard data
than be deprived of state data altogether. Although it might be
troublesome for the NCIC to contain a state’s invalid arrest
warrants, for instance, the state’s inclusion of far more numerous valid warrants in the national database enables police to
get dangerous individuals off the streets.
For its part, state inaction can be explained by a constellation of other factors. As noted at the outset, when it comes to
data, law enforcement agencies are predisposed to a “more is
better” philosophy, inured to the human hardships resulting
434
from database errors. And, suffice to it say no state agency
will rush to support legislation or regulations requiring more
rigorous data controls, which would have resource implications
or entail threat of liability. Private sector entities can also be
expected to resist any legislative efforts for these same reasons.
Ultimately as well, it should not escape attention that
while the political narrative favoring data quality is a very
compelling one, the fact remains that the adverse consequences
of data error fall squarely on individuals, who in the criminal
435
justice context typically lack political voice and influence. Cit432. Harmon, supra note 23, at 1143; see also id. at 1145 (“OJP—like the
FBI—serves police departments more than it serves those who might govern
and regulate law enforcement . . . .”).
433. See Kreag, supra note 23, at 1502–03.
434. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 156 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing “doubt that police forces already possess sufficient incentives to maintain up-to-date records”).
435. See Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure
Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 603–04 (2016). See generally Donald A. Dripps,
Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why
Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993) (analyzing the lack of political influence criminal defendants have in the political process).
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izens benefitting from political voice tend not to see themselves
as likely victims of criminal justice data error and therefore are
436
unlikely to press their elected representatives for change.
Rounding out the political dynamic, no politician wants to be
associated with anything an opponent can possibly cast as “pro437
criminal” in nature.
As a consequence, we are left with the unfortunate status
quo state of affairs described by Justice Ginsburg in her Herring dissent:
[T]he record indicates that there is no electronic connection between
the warrant database of the Dale County Sheriff ’s Department and
that of the County Circuit Clerk’s office, which is located in the basement of the same building. . . . When a warrant is recalled, one of the
‘many different people that have access to th[e] warrants,’ . . . must
find the hard copy of the warrant in the ‘two or three different places’
where the Department houses warrants, . . . return it to the Clerk’s
office, and manually update the Department’s database. . . . The record reflects no routine practice of checking the database for accuracy,
and the failure to remove the entry for Herring’s warrant was not discovered until [police] sought to pursue Herring five months later. Is it
not altogether obvious that the Department could take further pre438
cautions to ensure the integrity of its database?

When it comes to criminal justice data, the public and politicians do not seem to lack concern over its privacy implica439
tions. We hope that this Article, by cataloging the very significant harms caused by data error, can catalyze renewed
interest in data quality concerns, not seen since the late 1960s
and early 1970s, a time when the negative consequences of data error had political resonance. As a federal government report
on changing public attitudes on criminal history records observed:
[The late 1960s and early 1970s] was the period [when] many children of the Nation’s economic and social elites were being arrested —
for social protest, for racial demonstrations, for anti-war demonstrations. These were often the children of government officials, business
executives, and academics. The idea that you could have an arrest or
a conviction record for demonstrations or protests that would stigmatize you — so that you wouldn’t get into Princeton or get a job at the

436. See David M. Jaros, Preempting the Police, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1149, 1173
(2014).
437. See Dripps, supra note 435, at 1094.
438. Herring, 555 U.S. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
439. See Murphy, supra note 22, 503–07; Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Multi-State Privacy Push Paves the Way for National Reform, HUFFINGTON POST
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-levinsonwaldman/multi
-state-privacy-push_b_9031692.html.
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brokerage house, or couldn’t be appointed to Federal or State government employment — was obviously a great threat to the progress
of the children of the ruling class. How large-scale arrest and conviction records for social protest were going to be used became a political
440
issue in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which it is not today.

In a time not only of unprecedented growth in and access to
criminal justice data, but also when one in three adults has a
441
criminal record of some kind, a similar sensitivity would appear warranted.
CONCLUSION
A data-driven criminal justice system must confront the
reality of data error and the harms it causes. To date, however,
governments have been insulated from accountability for data
error, and thus have had little incentive to change. Meanwhile,
hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent for largely unenforced federal mandates intended to improve state criminal
justice system data quality. Worse yet, the problem is only going to grow in scope as data becomes easier to collect and share,
and new data sources (including biometrics) are integrated into
government databases, including courtesy of the private sec442
tor.
This Article seeks to challenge the premise that a datadriven criminal justice system must accept systemic error simply as an operating cost, effectively functioning as a tax on innocent individuals. The institutional and legislative solutions
proposed here are directed at minimizing the incidence of data
error and affording a basis for relief for those who suffer its
negative consequences. Audits, accreditation, federal intervention, financing, statutory reform, and litigation are all needed

440. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 187663,
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD USES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION 8–9
(July 2001), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pauchi.pdf.
441. Jo Craven McGinty, How Many Americans Have a Police Record?
Probably More than You Think, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/how-many-americans-have-a-police-record-probably-more-than
-you-think-1438939802.
442. For discussion of concerns regarding the accuracy of facial images secured and stored by the FBI, now numbering over thirty million, used as
matches in investigations, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16267, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY
AND ACCURACY 10–32 (May 2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf
(discussing FBI’s failure to conduct audits concerning false positives in the database and assess operational accuracy of face recognition searches more generally).
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to ensure that government databases are as accurate and upto-date as possible. If an ever-more data-driven criminal justice
system is the future, tolerance of data error and a culture of data impunity must become a thing of the past.

